Exorbitant Jurisdiction by Clermont, Kevin M. & Palmer, John R.B.
Maine Law Review 
Volume 58 
Number 2 Symposium: French and American 
Perspectives Towards International Law 
and International Institutions 
Article 9 
June 2006 
Exorbitant Jurisdiction 
Kevin M. Clermont 
John R.B. Palmer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kevin M. Clermont & John R. Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 Me. L. Rev. 473 (2006). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Maine 
School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 474 2006
474 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:2 
EXORBITANT JURISDICTION 
Kevin M Clermont· and John R.B. Palmer .. 
Exorbitant territorial jurisdiction in civil cases comprises those classes of 
jurisdiction, although exercised validly under a country's rules, that nonetheless are 
unfair to the defendant because of a lack of significant connection between the 
sovereign and either the parties or the dispute. The United States, France, and most of 
the rest of the world exercise a good deal of exorbitant jurisdiction so defined. In the 
United States, an emphasis on power derived from territoriality has led to jurisdictional 
restraint in some respects, but has also allowed general jurisdiction based solely on 
transient physical presence, the attachment of property, or extensive business activities 
unrelated to the cause of action. In contrast, the civil law's emphasis on fairness has 
kept France from developing these exorbitant bases of jurisdiction, but has failed to 
restrain it from asserting general jurisdiction based solely on the plaintiff's nationality. 
A number of other countries have added some wrinkles to their own brands of 
exorbitant jurisdiction. We conclude ( 1) that although the extent, details, and phrasing 
of the world's exorbitant bases of jurisdiction differ among nations, there appears to 
be a common core in the nations' urge to disregard defendants' interests in order to 
give their own people a way to sue at home, if the home country will be able to enforce 
the resulting judgment locally, and (2) that even though exorbitant jurisdiction is thus 
understandable, the ultimate goal should remain its elimination by international 
agreement. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the U.S. headquarters of a large international corporation, a famous 
comparative law professor, retained as a consultant, has just explained Europe's 
exorbitant bases of jurisdiction to a shocked group of U.S. lawyers. Among other 
things, the professor has explained that French courts are willing to assert jurisdiction 
over defendants with no connection whatsoever to France as long as the plaintiff is 
French. The corporation's general counsel, confident just moments earlier that his 
company was safe from suit in a country with which it had few contacts, is the first to 
react: 
"The bases of jurisdiction which you just outlined for us strike me as being not only 
improper and exorbitant, but as totally uncivilized." 
"Just as uncivilized," replies the professor, "is our assertion that a contactless forum 
can obtain personal jurisdiction over a transiently 'present' defendant on the sole 
ground that he was ambushed by a seedy-looking process server." 1 
• Flanagan Professor of Law, Cornell University. The authors wish to thank Philippe Zambrowski, 
LL.M., Cornell Law School, 2003, for his invaluable research on French law. 
•• Associate Supervisory Staff Attorney, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The 
views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views or policies of the 
Second Circuit or any other entity. 
I. RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 292-93 (3d ed. 1970). This fictional dialogue has 
introduced generations of U.S. law students to comparative law. For comprehensibility out of context, we 
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This dialogue is a good starting point for our discussion of exorbitant jurisdiction-
specifically, exorbitant territorial jurisdiction in civil cases-because it so perfectly 
encapsulates the subject. Many countries allow their courts to assert jurisdiction over 
defendants in circumstances that outsiders find shockingly uncivilized. 2 Yet, these 
outsiders tend to overlook thdr own countries' excesses. As the dialogue's focus 
suggests, this dynamic may be particularly acute when it comes to the United States 
and France, where the common law and civilian legal traditions have produced 
jurisdictional rules that can sometimes appear very different from one another. 
To bridge the gulf, it is necessary to examine the world's exorbitant bases of 
jurisdiction more closely, to understand the contexts in which they arose, and to 
appraise them not just by their formal expression, but also by their actual 
implementation, effectiveness, and practical consequences. 3 In this article, we focus 
on the United States and France, but our aim is to suggest that the world's different 
bases of exorbitant jurisdiction are, in essence, not as different as they appear. 
To begin with, one must understand what it means for jurisdiction to be exorbitant. 
The concept of exorbitant jurisdiction is fundamental to private international law, 
affecting, as it does, the question of whether a court's judgment will receive 
recognition outside the rendering country. 4 The concept, however, remains ill-defined. 
While F.A. Mann would tie the definition to the basic sources of international law, 
"special regard being had to the practice of States and the general principles of law 
recognised by civilized nations," 5 his approach seems to be more an aspiration than a 
reflection of current reality.6 One can glean definitions from certain treaties 7-the 
most important of which is the Brussels Convention and its succeeding E.U. 
Regulation 8-but these treaties are limited in application. Given current practice 
outside the obligations imposed by these treaties, and to some extent practice that 
have modified the dialogue slightly from the original. The dialogue first appeared in the casebook's second 
edition in I 959, but the particular exchange paraphrased above did not appear until 1970. In the current 
edition, RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, HANS w. BAADE, PETER E. HERZOG & Eow ARD M. WISE, COMPARATIVE 
LAw (6th ed. 1998), the casebook's authors have transformed this exchange to focus more on the effect of 
the Brussels Convention on U.S. parties sued in France. 
2. See generally Kurt H. Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora, in XXTH CENTURY 
COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 321 (Kurt H. Nadelmann et al. eds., 1961), reprinted in KURTH. 
NADELMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS: INTERNATIONAL AND INTERsTATE 222 ( 1972); L.1. De Winter, Excessive 
Jurisdiction in Private International Law, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 706 ( 1968). 
3. See Xavier Blanc-Jouvan, Centennial World Congress on Comparative Law: Closing Remarks, 75 
TuL. L. REV. 1235, 1237 (2001) (discussing the challenges of comparative law generally). 
4. Some would actually define exorbitant jurisdiction according to whether a particular judgment 
receives recognition by foreign courts. E.g., De Winter, supra note 2, at 712. In other words, if a judgment 
gets recognized abroad, it must have been rendered on a nonexorbitant basis of jurisdiction. 
5. F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 111 RECUEIL DES COURS I, 47 
(1964), reprinted in F.A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW I, 37 (1973), updated in F.A. MANN, 
FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW I (1990). 
6. See De Winter, supra note 2, at 712. 
7. See Joseph Halpern, "Exorbitant Jurisdiction" and the Brussels Convention: Toward a Theory of 
Restraint, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 369 (1983) (deriving a definition from the Brussels Convention); 
see also Kurt H. Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: The 
Common Market Draft, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (1967). 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 81-89. 
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results from these obligations, 9 it is hard to make a case for the definition of exorbitant 
jurisdiction using international law. 
Instead, exorbitant jurisdiction is best understood less as an existing rule than as 
a normative statement about the appropriate scope of international jurisdiction. To be 
"exorbitant" is to exceed ordinary or proper bounds, to be immoderate, perhaps even 
offensive-literally to have departed from one's track. 10 Identifying a particular basis 
for jurisdiction as exorbitant is, thus, to condemn it as inappropriate from an 
international standpoint. 
Accordingly, we might define exorbitant jurisdiction as jurisdiction exercised 
validly under a country's rules that nevertheless appears unreasonable because of the 
grounds necessarily used to justify jurisdiction. 11 But we can probably go farther than 
this subjective test and identify an objective standard on which accusations of 
exorbitance tend to rely. That standard seems to focus on whether a class of 
jurisdiction, as opposed to a single assertion of jurisdiction, is unfair to the defendant 
because of a lack of significant connection between the sovereign and either the parties 
or the dispute. 12 And it is certainly by this standard that the world judges certain 
jurisdictional rules of both the United States and France to be exorbitant. 
With this definition in mind, we turn to examining t_he world's exorbitant bases 
of jurisdiction. Part II of this article summarizes the law of the United States, where 
an emphasis on power deriving from territoriality has led to jurisdictional restraint in 
some respects, but has nonetheless allowed general jurisdiction based solely on 
9. Outside of treaty obligations, many countries continue to assert bases of jurisdiction that others find 
exorbitant. The recognition and enforcement treaties themselves add to the variation in national practice in 
some respects, even while decreasing it in others. For instance, English courts have long held French 
nationality-based jurisdiction to be exorbitant, see Schibsby v. Westenholz, (1870) 6 L.R.Q.B. 155, 163 
(Eng.), but under the Brussels Regulation they are now obligated to enforce French judgments based on such 
jurisdiction, as long as the defendant is not a treaty country's domiciliary. See infra Part m.A.2.c. 
10. See CHAMBERS DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY (Robert K. Barnhart ed., 1988); OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1991); United States v. Oglesby Grocery Co., 264 F. 691,695 (N.D. Ga. 1920), rev'd 
on other grounds, 255 U.S. 108 (1921). 
11. This is a slight modification of the definition offered by Kathryn A. Russell, Exorbitant Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement of Judgments: The Brussels System as an Impetus for United States Action, 19 SYRACUSE 
J. INT'LL. & COM. 57, 59 (1993) ("jurisdiction validly exercised under the jurisdictional rules of a state that 
nevertheless appears unreasonable to non-nationals because of the grounds used to justify jurisdiction"). We 
have removed her reference to "non-nationals" in recognition of the fact that a state's nationals are 
sometimes among the most vocal critics of the state's jurisdictional rules. We have changed "grounds used 
to justify jurisdiction" to "grounds necessarily used to justify jurisdiction" based on our view that an 
assertion of jurisdiction is exorbitant only when it rests solely on an exorbitant basis, not merely when an 
exorbitant basis happens to have been invoked to justify it. 
12. See Halpern, supra note 7, at 379. Catherine Kessedjian, Hague Conference on Private Int'I Law, 
June 1997, International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Prelim. 
Doc. No. 7, ,i 138 (Apr. 1997), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd7.pdf, suggested the 
following definition: 
Id. 
[ J)urisdiction is exorbitant when the court seised does not possess a sufficient connection 
with the parties to the case, the circumstances of the case, the cause or subject of the action, 
or fails to take account of the principle of the proper administration of justice. An exorbitant 
form of jurisdiction is one which is solely intended to promote political interests, without 
taking into consideration the interests of the two parties to the dispute. 
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transient physical presence, the attachment of property, or extensive business activities 
unrelated to the cause of action. Part III contrasts the civil law's emphasis on fairness, 
which has kept France from developing these exorbitant bases of jurisdiction, but has 
failed to restrain it from asserting general jurisdiction based solely on the plaintiff's 
nationality. Part IV looks briefly at exorbitant jurisdiction in a number of other 
countries for the purpose of further comparison. We conclude that although the extent, 
details, and phrasing of the world's exorbitant bases of jurisdiction differ among 
nations, there appears to be a common core: nations are inclined to disregard 
defendants' interests in order to give their own people a way to sue at home when the 
forum country will be able to enforce the resulting judgment locally. To understand 
this common core, however, is also to appreciate exorbitant jurisdiction's pervasive 
dangers and hence the need for its ultimate elimination. 
II. THE UNITED STATES 
The basic U.S. law on the subject of territorial authority to adjudicate is, in a 
nutshell, this: the forum acquires adjudicatory authority in civil cases through power 
over the target of the action (be it a person or a thing), unless litigating the action there 
is unreasonable (that is, fundamentally unfair}--although the sovereign can naturally 
choose self-restraint ( exercising less than its full adjudicatory authority). 13 
Within this general formulation have developed certain categories and bases of 
jurisdiction that much of the world views as exorbitant. As suggested in the above-
quoted dialogue, courts in the United States shock the world by asserting jurisdiction 
over a defendant based merely on the defendant's transient physical presence. Also 
shocking is the U.S. version of attachment jurisdiction, as well as its doing-business 
jurisdiction. 14 
A. Transient Jurisdiction 
The ancient basis of presence gives the state power to adjudicate any personal 
claim if the defendant is served with process within the state's territorial limits. Thus, 
even momentary presence of the defendant creates power to adjudicate a claim totally 
unrelated to that presence. 15 So imagine that D, a Minnesotan driving to Maine for a 
vacation, stops at a gas station in Vermont and, while waiting in line there, assaults P, 
who is a businessman from Ohio. P sues D in an Ohio state court, managing to serve 
D with process when D stops for the night in Ohio on a later trip to New York. In 
these circumstances, such ''transient jurisdiction," or ''tag jurisdiction," is constitu-
13. See generally KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CML PROCEDURE§ 4.2 (2005). 
14. See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 89, 
111-15 (1999). 
15. See Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 270-71 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that a 
Florida corporation had achieved effective in-state, in-hand service of process on a German attending a 
convention in New Orleans; jurisdiction was upheld in this Louisiana action on a contract between them for 
delivery of German goods to Florida); Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (holding that 
service on defendant flying over state was valid); Darrah v. Watson, 36 Iowa I 16 (1873) (holding that court 
acquired personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant who was in state only a few hours but was 
personally served). 
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tional. Burnham v. Superior Court16 seemed to suggest that transient jurisdiction, 
merely because of its historical pedigree, satisfies any reasonableness test. However, 
transient jurisdiction probably is constitutional only where its application is not so 
outlandish as to be unreasonable in the particular circumstances. 17 
Despite former attempts to fictitiously apply the "presence" concept to 
corporations, the view today is that this basis meaningfully refers only to jurisdiction 
over individuals because only individuals can be physically present. Service on a 
corporate employee present in the state, however, does not establish personal 
jurisdiction over the corporation. 18 
Even for individuals, the presence basis for personal jurisdiction is not an 
inevitable one. Formerly the most important basis of U.S. jurisdiction, it is today far 
from essential. Indeed, transient jurisdiction is used by U.S. courts only when all 
appropriate bases of jurisdiction are unavailing. It is occasionally used to sue 
foreigners in the United States, even though the resulting judgment would be unlikely 
to receive recognition or enforcement abroad. 19 Transient jurisdiction as a basis of 
general jurisdiction has long been the recipient of criticism from academics and 
foreigners alike.20 Given transient jurisdiction's overall lack of utility and dubious 
propriety, the United States should accept its prohibition as the price for a general 
jurisdiction-and-judgments treaty, and it appears willing to do so.21 
B. Attachment Jurisdiction 
Attachment jurisdiction is used in cases where the plaintiff has a personal claim 
against the defendant and seeks to satisfy the claim by attaching unrelated property of 
the defendant-or by garnishing an unrelated obligation owed the defendant by a third 
party-without obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant.22 For example, the 
16. 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (upholding jurisdiction of the California state court in a suit seeking divorce 
and money). After a New Jersey couple separated by agreement and the wife and their two children moved 
to California, the wife served process on the husband while he briefly visited California on business and to 
see his children. Id. at 607-08. 
17. See Sarieddine v. Moussa, 820 S.W.2d 837,840 (Tex. App. 1991). 
18. See Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1915). 
19. See DAVID EPSTEIN, JEFFREY L. SNYDER & CHARLES s. BALDWIN, IV, INTERNATIONAL LmGATION 
§ 6.04[3] (3d ed. 2002); LoUISE ELLEN TEITZ, TRANSNATIONAL LmGATION § 1-6, at 50-52 (1996). 
20. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CML LmGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 121-23 (3d ed. 
1996); MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE 78 (1995) (explaining that most 
Western European countries do not utilize transient jurisdiction); Stephen B. Burbank, The United States' 
Approach to International Civil Litigation: Recent Developments in Forum Selection, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L 
EcON. L. I, 13-14, 18 (I 998); Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially over International Defendants: 
Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 593, 599-601; Russell 
J. Weintraub,An Objective Basis/or Rejecting TransientJurisdiction, 22 RUTGERSL.J. 61 I, 613-16 (1991); 
Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Status of American Law in the Hague Judgments Convention Project, 61 ALB. 
L. REV. 1283, 1296-97 (1998) (explaining that transientjurisdiction conflicts with international standards). 
21. See Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial Is Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention 
and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167, 189-90 (1998) [hereinafter 
Weintraub I]; Russell J. Weintraub, Negotiating the Tort Long-Arm Provisions of the Judgments 
Convention, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1269, 1278-79 (1998). 
22. But cf Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 326 n.10 (1980) (recognizing that some states limit some 
kinds of attachment jurisdiction to resident plaintiffs). 
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plaintiff might seek attachment jurisdiction in a New York state court for a tort claim 
arising from an auto accident elsewhere by garnishing the defendant's New York 
property. 
To satisfy the power test, this kind of quasi in rem jurisdiction normally must be 
exercised where the thing is. Unreasonableness will then be the key test. But here the 
unreasonableness test is particularly difficult to satisfy today because attachment 
jurisdiction is no longer really necessary and can be quite unfair. 
Historically, attachment jurisdiction was quite useful. If the plaintiff had any 
claim against the defendant but failed to acquire personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff 
could proceed against any of the defendant's property within the state, such as a bank 
account. The defendant usually defaulted, and the resulting judgment allowed the 
plaintiff to apply the property to satisfy the claim. If successful, the plaintiff would 
apply the bank account to awarded court costs and then to satisfaction of the claim 
itself. Anything extra would go back to the defendant. However, on such attachment 
jurisdiction, the plaintiffs recovery was limited to the bank account. 23 The defendant 
was not liable for any deficiency. The plaintiff could later sue for any unsatisfied 
portion of the claim, either in personam or again by attachment against other property 
belonging to the defendant. 
Also, attachment jurisdiction was formerly quite appropriate. Consider its local 
origin. In the infant American colonies, a tremendous trade deficit with the mother 
country led to a severe shortage of cash. This in turn induced a risky reliance on credit 
and gave rise, in part, to the Depression of 1640. Bad economic times and lessened 
social cohesiveness encouraged debtors to abscond or at least to evade payment. The 
inadequacy of the colony's rudimentary personal jurisdiction to fulfill the politically 
powerful local and English creditors' consequent collection needs motivated the 
legislative and judicial development of attachment jurisdiction around 1650. 
Henceforth, the creditor could attach any local property of the missing debtor, and then 
satisfy any resulting judgment out of that property. 24 
Three hundred and fifty years later, attachment jurisdiction is still with us. In the 
course of history, it facilitated the industrialization of America and often worked 
justice. But today the needs that generated it are much less intense, because personal 
jurisdiction has greatly expanded. Nevertheless, the courts must continue to divert 
resources to determine the doctrinal implications and complications of attachment 
jurisdiction and to control the abuses that this ancient form of jurisdiction would 
otherwise allow. 
For example, in Ha"is v. Balk, 25 the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could 
invoke this kind of jurisdiction by garnishing a debt owing from a third person to the 
defendant, in order to pursue the plaintiffs unrelated claim against the out-of-state 
defendant. The debt was the res, and the forum state deemed the debt present within 
the state because the third person was temporarily present in that state. However, in 
23. See CME Media Enters. B.V. v. Zelezny, No. 01 Civ. 1733, 2001 WL 1035138 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 
2001) (bank account contained one nickel). 
24. See GEORGE LEE HAsKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETIS 215-20 ( 1960); Joseph 
J. Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi In Rem and In Personam 
Principles, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1147, 1150-62. 
25. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). 
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Shaffer v. Heitner, 26 the Court overturned Harris by making clear that nonpersonal 
jurisdiction must pass the reasonableness test. It is not reasonable for a court to 
entertain a totally unrelated claim, based merely on the presence of some bit of the 
defendant's property, even if the defendant's liability were limited to the value of that 
property. Something more-an adequate relation of the forum, the parties, and the 
litigation-has to exist before a court will, in its subjective opinion, deem an 
adjudication to be fundamentally fair. 
The result of Shaffer is that attachment jurisdiction is now available only27 in the 
rather special situations described by the following four hypotheticals: 
(I) Ohio plaintiff sues by attaching Iowa defendant's land in New York in order to 
secure a judgment being sought by plaintiff in California for personal injuries 
stemming from a traffic accident with defendant in California. Attachment 
jurisdiction in New York is constitutional. 28 
(2) Ohio plaintiff sues by attaching Iowa defendant's land in New York in order to 
enforce a judgment already rendered for plaintiff in California for personal injuries 
stemming from a traffic accident with defendant in California. Attachment 
jurisdiction in New York is constitutional. 29 
(3) Ohio plaintiff sues by attaching Iowa defendant's land in New York in order to 
recover for his personal injuries stemming from a traffic accident with defendant in 
New York. Attachment jurisdiction in New York is constitutional. If a state could 
constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction, it may choose to allow a plaintiff 
instead to cast the suit in the form of attachment jurisdiction, 30 although arguably the 
Constitution prohibits actual seizure solely for this unnecessary formalism.31 
(4) Ohio plaintiff sues by attaching French defendant's land in New York in order 
to recover for his personal injuries stemming from a traffic accident with defendant 
in Japan. Attachment jurisdiction in New York is thought to be constitutional, 
assuming personal jurisdiction is not available in any other American forum. 32 This 
is an example of so-called jurisdiction by necessity, in which the unavailability of an 
alternative American forum arguably allows jurisdiction to squeak by the 
unreasonableness test. Other factors could help to rebut unreasonableness, such as 
26. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
27. But see Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343, 345-48 (Utah 1980) (broadly allowing such jurisdiction 
whenever based on attachment of real estate). 
28. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 210; see also Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. 
Supp. 1044, 1048-49 (N.D. Cal. 1977). In particular, New York might require legislative authorization of 
any form of jurisdiction, and its legislature has not in fact authorized this sort of anticipatory attachment. 
See DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE§ 104 (4th ed. 2005). 
29. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 210 n.36; see also Biel v. Boehm, 406 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 
1978). 
30. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 208 & n.29; see also LAWRENCE W. NEWMAN & DAVID 
ZAsLOWSKY, LmGATING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 35 (1996). 
31. See Richard W. Bourne, The Demise of Foreign Attachment, 21 CREIGI-ITON L. REV. 141, 185-95 
(1987) (invoking the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution). 
32. See Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (a post-Shaffer federal case, 
allowing New York plaintiffs to obtain attachment jurisdiction in a New York state court for a tort claim 
arising from a plane crash in Turkey, simply by garnishing a New York bank account belonging to the 
defendant Turkish Airlines); cf Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 211 n.3 7 (leaving the constitutional question 
open). 
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the neediness of the plaintiff or some link between the cause of action and the 
attached property. Power is no problem, because the property is present in New York. 
481 
Only jurisdiction in the fourth situation, which remains constitutionally shaky, 
might constitute exorbitant jurisdiction. It receives regular criticism, although it 
actually sees little use. 33 The United States should be, and seemed to be in the course 
of recent negotiations at The Hague, willing to surrender that use in exchange for a 
general jurisdiction-and-judgments treaty. 34 
C. Doing-Business Jurisdiction 
The vibrant basis of personal jurisdiction gives the state power over an individual 
or corporation that has committed certain state-directed acts, but the power extends 
only to personal claims arising out of those acts. 35 
As the level of the defendant's state-directed activity increases, however, the 
state's constitutional power extends to claims less related in nature and time to that 
activity. Both the level of activity and the degree of unrelatedness are continua. If 
state-directed activities are considerable, the activities will bestow power, even though 
the activities might be considered partial, parallel, or incidental to the activities that the 
claim actually "arose from," as long as those state-directed activities sufficiently 
"relate to" the claim. Indeed, if a defendant's business activities in the forum state 
when served with process are extensively continuous and systematic-which is 
phrased as "doing business" rather than merely "transacting business"-the defendant 
becomes subject to jurisdiction even on claims wholly unrelated to the in-state 
activities. Thus, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 36 held that the 
defendant's activities were so extensive in the forum state as to support jurisdiction in 
an action unrelated to those activities. In this way, the development of jurisdiction 
based on state-directed acts has brought into the open the absence of any clear 
distinction between specific and general jurisdiction-they just comprise the rules for 
the two ends of the unrelatedness continuum. 37 
In any event, truly general jurisdiction based on doing business, which is peculiar 
to the United States, 38 entails terrible problems ofline-drawing and does not conform 
33. See Michael B. Mushlin, The New Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction: New York's Revival of a Doctrine 
Whose Time Has Passed, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1059, 1095-96, 1100 (1990). 
34. See generally A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE (John 
J. Barcelo ill & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002). 
35. See Int'! Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1945). 
36. 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (upholding jurisdiction in an Ohio state court suit against a Philippine 
corporation, which was performing all of its management activities in Ohio while mining was suspended 
by the effects of war in the Philippines, on a basically unrelated claim); cf Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (finding no general jurisdiction of Texas over a foreign 
corporation, but not reaching the difficult issue of more specific jurisdiction). 
37. Compare Russo v. Sea WorldofFla., Inc., 709 F. Supp. 39, 44 (D.R.I. 1989) (applying due process 
test and holding that slip-and-fall claims did not "arise out of or relate" to Florida theme park's sale of ticket 
to plaintiff in Rhode Island and that its other Rhode Island sales activity did not create general jurisdiction), 
and Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997) (similar), with Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 
94 F.3d 708, 716 (1st Cir. 1996) (reading due process's requirement of relating to in-state transaction of 
business more loosely). 
38. See REIMANN, supra note 20, at 77, 82-83. 
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to the usual rationale of general jurisdiction. 39 This basis of general jurisdiction arose 
to provide appropriate jurisdiction when specific jurisdiction was not yet fully 
available. Because doing-business jurisdiction requires the defendant to be so active 
in the forum as to seem a native,40 it is seldom available under its own terms.41 Today, 
courts resort to it, albeit usually improperly, only when all appropriate bases of 
personal jurisdiction fail to reach the defendant. 42 
Yet, elimination of this doing-business basis is controversial. For reasons difficult 
to accept, some objective persons in the United States retain allegiance to it.43 Given 
the shortcomings of doing-business jurisdiction, however, a general jurisdiction-and-
judgments treaty should abolish this basis of general jurisdiction. Of course, the more 
common activity-based jurisdiction that falls more solidly within specific jurisdiction 
should survive. 
Ill. FRANCE 
Undeniably, France too has sometimes succumbed to parochial impulses in 
jurisdictional matters. Its courts have read the Civil Code's Article 14 as authorizing 
territorial jurisdiction over virtually any action brought by a plaintiff of French 
nationality (while reading Article 15 to make excessive any foreign nation's exercise 
of jurisdiction over an unwilling French defendant). 44 Thus, a French person can sue 
at home on any cause of action, whether or not the events in suit related to France and 
regardless of the defendant's connections and interests. The forum-shopping potential 
of this jurisdiction based on the plaintiff's nationality is evident, whether or not that 
potential is realized in actual practice. 
39. See BORN,supra note 20, at 103-16. 
40. See Charles W. "Rocky'' Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807, 811 
(2004). 
41. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984) (holding that 
"mere purchases, even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a State's assertion of in 
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause of action not related to those purchase 
transactions"). Compare Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1993) (insufficient activity 
in Maryland to create general jurisdiction over IUD manufacturer), with Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-
Ceco Corp., 84 F .3d 560, 576 (2d Cir. 1996) (general jurisdiction over building materials manufacturer was 
unreasonable "in the absence of any cognizable interest on the part of the plaintiff or the State of Vermont 
in adjudicating these claims in Vermont"). 
42. E.g., Frummerv. Hilton Hotels Int'), Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851,854 (N.Y. 1967); Bryant v. Finnish Nat'! 
Airline, 208 N.E.2d 439 (N. Y. 1965) (maintaining a small New York office for paperwork and a small New 
York bank account creates general jurisdiction in New York); see Weintraub I, supra note 21, at 188 
( explaining that elimination of doing-business jurisdiction "will block suit in only a few cases in which the 
United States has a legitimate interest in providing a forum"). 
43. See ALI, Report 2000: INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT 14-15 (2000) 
( describing this dispute as a possible "deal-breaker"). But cf Linda J. Silberman, Can the Hague Judgments 
Project Be Saved?: A Perspective from the United States, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 34, at 159, 175-79 (suggesting a compromise); Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep 
Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 214 (ultimately willing to 
give up this basis against foreign defendants). 
44. See CODE CML [C. CIV.] arts. 14-15. We have adapted our analysis of French jurisdiction from 
Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, French Article 14 Jurisdiction, Viewed from the United States, in 
DE TOUS HORIZONS: MELANGES XAVIER BLANC-JOUVAN 473 (2005). 
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French Article 14 jurisdiction distinguishes itself from the United States' 
exorbitant bases by overtly emphasizing the Frenchness of the plaintiff. The French 
are not alone in basing their brand of exorbitant jurisdiction on the plaintiff's 
nationality. Jurisdiction in the style of Article 14 emigrated with French law to a 
number of other countries, such as Belgium, Gabon, Greece, Haiti, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Romania, and Senegal.45 However, the Belgians abandoned this 
45. On Belgium's nineteenth-century adoption of this style of jurisdiction, see Nadelmann, supra note 
2, at 323. 
On Gabon, see Law of July 29, 1972, art. 27, reprinted in relevant part in 2 GEORGESR. DELAUME, 
TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS: APPLICABLE LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (A STUDY IN CONFLICT 
AVOIDANCE)§ 8.02, at 3 n.l (1990). 
On Greece, see ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, CHARALAMBOS F'RAGIST AS & A lllANASSIOS 
YIANNOPOULOS, AMERICAN-GREEK PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (1957); Pelayia Yessiou-Faltsi, 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement, in DOING BUSINESS IN GREECE§ 24.1, at 1 (Eugene T. Rossides et al. eds., 
1996) ( explaining that their Code of Civil Procedure of 1834 arts. 27 & 28 based jurisdiction on the 
plaintiff's nationality); Brian Pearce, Note, The Comity Doctrine as a Ba"ier to Judicial Jurisdiction: A 
U.S.-£. U. Comparison, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 525, 538-39 (1994). 
On Haiti, see Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y .B. INT'L L. 145, 173 
(1975); F.A. Mann, supra note 5, at 39; Nadelmann, supra note 2, at 324 & n.4 (citing their Civil Code art. 
16). 
On Luxembourg, see C. CIV. art. 14, which is identical to its French counterpart, aside from inserting 
references to Luxembourg in place of those to France. 
On the Netherlands, see R.D. KOLLEWIJN, AMERICAN-DUTCH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-31 
(2ded.1961);RENEVANROOIJ&MAURJCEV.POLAK,PRIVATEINTERNATIONALLAWINTHENETHERLANDS 
53 (1987) (noting that their Code of Civil Procedure art. 127 formerly based jurisdiction on the plaintiff's 
nationality); Pearce, supra, at 539. 
On Romania, see C. CIV. art. 13 (1864), available at http://diasan.vsat.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.frarne; 
MICHEL B. BOERESCO, ETUDE SUR LA CONDffiON DES ETRANGERS D'APRES LA LEGISLATION ROUMAINE 
RAPPROCHEE D  LA LEGISLATION FRANc;:AISE 326-29 (Paris, V. Giard & E. Briere 1899); Chr. J. Suliotis, De 
la condition des etrangers en Roumanie, 14 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 559, 565 (1887) 
(indicating that this provision of the Romanian Civil Code was interpreted expansively by the Romanian 
courts, much as the French Article 14 has been interpreted expansively by the French courts); see also Renee 
Sanilevici, The Romanian Civil Code and Its Fate Under the Communist Regime, in EUROPEAN LEGAL 
TRADmoNs AND IsRAEL 355,357 (Alfredo Mordechai Rabello ed., 1994) (noting that the Romanian Civil 
Code of 1864 was modeled closely on the French Civil Code). 
On Senegal, see 2 DELAUME, supra, § 8.02, at 3 n. l. 
On Quebec, according to Akehurst, supra, at 173, the Canadian Province of Quebec also bases 
jurisdiction on the plaintiff's nationality. However, this appears to be incorrect, both today and at the time 
Akehurst was writing. Akehurst supports his assertion by citing JEAN-GABRIEL CASTEL, CONFLICT OF 
LAws 951,953 (2d ed. 1968). That source simply reproduces the text of Quebec's Civil Code of 1866 art. 
27, which read: "Aliens, although not resident in Lower Canada, may be sued in its courts for the fulfilment 
of obligations contracted by them in foreign countries." While this provision seemed to show the influence 
of France's Article 14, it nonetheless lacked any explicit reference to the plaintiff's nationality. More 
importantly, it was read not to confer jurisdiction, but merely to make clear that the fact of the defendant's 
being an alien did not oust jurisdiction. See JEAN-GABRIEL CASTEL, PRlv A TE INTERNATIONAL LAW 240-41 
( 1960). Thus, courts had to rely on one of the jurisdictional bases provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 
see id. at 240 & n.35, and these bases did not include a plaintiff's nationality rule, see C. CIV. arts. 68-75 
(2003); CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED arts. 94-104 (Philippe Ferland ed., Wilson & Lafleur 1964); 
CODE OF CML PROCEDURE OF LoWER CANADA arts. 34-42 (Ottawa, Malcolm Cameron 1867); QUEBEC 
CIVIL LAW 701-04 (John E.C. Brierley & Roderick A. Macdonald eds., 1993). Moreover, while the text of 
art. 27 had remained essentially unchanged since it was first proposed by the drafters of the Civil Code of 
1866, see CIVIL CODE 1866-1980: AN HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL EDITION 23 (Paul-A. Crepeau & John E.C. 
Brierley eds., 1981); Second Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Codify the Laws of Lower Canada 
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approach in 1876,46 the Romanians appear to have abandoned it in 1924,47 the Greeks48 
and the Dutch49 abandoned it in the 1940s, and the Senegalese limited its use in 1972. so 
These countries' specific reasons for surrendering nationality-based jurisdiction were 
diverse. But generally surrender came when internal and external criticism and 
pressure, combined with a desire to do the just thing, began to outweigh the benefits 
derived from doing the exorbitant thing. The first set of factors have tended to increase 
with passing time, but some of the bigger countries have shown a persistent ability to 
resist those factors, perhaps because these countries derived more benefits from their 
exorbitances. 
The hold-out countries prompt the need not only for academic criticism but also 
for international retaliation or, better, international agreement. st Retaliations attempt 
to increase the costs of exercising exorbitant jurisdiction, while treaties would try to 
achieve the benefits of exorbitance through alternate means. That is, a treaty would 
provide the nation's deserving plaintiffs a reasonable forum, even if not always a home 
forum, and would ensure them easy enforcement of any resulting judgment. 
in Civil Matters, in CIVIL CODE OF LoWER CANADA 139,151,253 (Quebec, George E. Desbarats 1865), it 
was entirely removed from the Civil Code during the revisions of the 1990s, see HENRI KELADA, CODE CML 
DU QUEBEC (2003). 
46. Although the Belgians did not formally abrogate their statutory provision until I 949, they ceased 
applying it in 1876, except as a retaliatory measure. See Nadelmann, supra note 2, at 323; see also infra 
note 154 and accompanying text. 
47. See C. C1v. (indicating that art. 13 was abrogated by legislation on Feb. 24, 1924), available at 
http://www.corpvs.org/ (last visited April 18, 2006). In contrast, much of the rest of Romania's Civil Code 
of 1864 appears to have remained intact to this day. See Flavius A. Baias, Romanian Civil and Commercial 
Law, in LEGAL REFORM IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE: THE VIEW FROM WITHIN 21 I, 213 n.3, 231 
(Stanislaw Frankowski & Paul B. Stephan ID eds., 1995) (indicating that the only change to the Civil Code 
of 1864 was made in ''the part dealing with persons and family"); Samuel L. Bufford, Romanian Bankruptcy 
Law: A Central European Example, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 251, 251-52 (1997); Sanilevici, 
supra note 45, at 358-59. But see John W. Van Doren, Romania: Ripe for Privatization and Democracy? 
Legal Education as a Microcosm, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 113, 139 (1995) (citing H.B. JACOBINI, ROMANIAN 
PUBLIC LAW 7 (1987), for the proposition that the Romanian "codes of today are radically changed from 
those inherited from the nineteenth century''). 
48. The Greeks abandoned such jurisdiction legislatively, by repealing their statutory provision in I 946. 
See EHRENZWEIG ET AL., supra note 45, at 30 (identifying the legislation that effected this repeal as the 
Introductory Law to the Civil Code of I 940); Yessiou-Faltsi, supra note 45, at I (stating that the 
Introductory Law to the Civil Code entered into force on Feb. 23, 1946); Pearce, supra note 45, at 538-39. 
See also Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos, Historical Development, in INTRODUCTION TO GREEK LAW I, JO 
(Konstantinos D. Kerarneus & Phaedon J. Kozyris eds., 2d rev. ed. 1993) (explaining that Civil Code of 
1940 did not enter into force until 1946 because of the Axis invasion). 
49. The Dutch abandoned such jurisdiction through a court decision in 1940, which effectively removed 
plaintiffs nationality as a basis for jurisdiction. See 2 DELAUME, supra note 45, § 8.06, at 15; KOLLEWIJN, 
supra note 45, at 30-31; J.P. Verheul, Private International Law, in INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH LAW FOR 
FOREIGN LAWYERS 263, 280 n.88 (D.C. Fokkema et al. eds., 1978). The Dutch finally repealed their 
statutory provision in 1992. See Th.M. de Boer & R. Kotting, Private International Law, in INTRODUCTION 
TO DUTCH LAw 265, 270 n.21 (J.M.J. Chorus et al. eds., 3d rev. ed. 1999). The Dutch had shifted to 
jurisdiction based on plaintiffs domicile. See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
50. The Senegalese have abandoned such jurisdiction in cases where ''the judgment must necessarily 
be enforced abroad." Law No. 72-61 of June 12, 1972, reprinted in 2 DELAUME, supra note 45, § 8.02, at 
3 n. I. Compare our discussion infra Part ID.B. I, however, where it becomes apparent that such a limitation 
may not represent much of a change from the way the jurisdictional basis applies in practice. 
51. See infra text accompanying note 154; see also De Winter, supra note 2, at 720. 
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At any rate, France remains the most significant country to continue to exert 
jurisdiction based on the plaintiff's nationality, and so it is the French who bear the 
brunt of this rule's criticism. Accordingly, U.S. commentators love to use Article 14 
as an example of exorbitant jurisdiction, one that illustrates how the law of the 
international jungle puts U.S. litigants at a disadvantage and creates a need for a 
jurisdiction-and-judgments treaty. 52 A hypothetical serves to demonstrate the 
illustrative power of Article 14: 
Assume that Emily Sherwin, a New York law professor with property in 
London, had a car collision in Ithaca, New York, with Xavier Blanc-Jouvan, a law 
professor visiting from France. Imagine that Professor Blanc-Jouvan sues Professor 
Sherwin in Paris. This jurisdiction is okay under the French Civil Code's Article 14, 
being personal jurisdiction based on the plaintiff's French nationality. Moreover, a 
judgment for Blanc-Jouvan will be entitled under the Brussels Regulation to 
recognition and enforcement against Sherwin's property in England. 
Now assume conversely that the collision was in Paris. Imagine that Sherwin 
sues Blanc-Jouvan in New York. This jurisdiction is impermissible under U.S. law. 
If a default judgment were rendered, neither France nor England (nor any U.S. court) 
would enforce it, because the lack of personal jurisdiction made the judgment invalid. 
Even a litigated judgment would enjoy far less than automatic recognition and 
enforcement abroad. 
52. See, e.g., KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CML PROCEDURE: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE 13-14 
(1999); Beverly May Carl, The Common Market Judgments Convention-Its Threat and Challenge to 
Americans, 8 lNT'L LAW. 446, 447-51 (1974); Kevin M. Clermont, An Introduction to the Hague Con-
vention, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS, supra note 34, at 3, 4-5; Clermont, supra 
note 14, at 91-94; Nadelmann, supra note 2, at 321-28, 330-35 (calling it the "notorious" Article 14); 
Russell, supra note 11, at 59-60; Andrew L. Strauss, Where America Ends and the International Order 
Begins: Interpreting the Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Constitution in Light of a Proposed Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Satisfaction of Judgments, 61 ALB. L. REV. 123 7, 1239-40 (I 998). 
Unsurprisingly, U.S. commentators have not been the only ones to attack Article 14 jurisdiction. 
For an early German criticism, see L. BAR, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRIVATE AND CRIMINAL 510 n.12 (G.R. 
Gillespie trans., Boston, Soule & Bugbee I 883) ( calling Article 14 jurisdiction "an invasion of the principles 
of international law ... drawn [partly] ... from the natural desire to protect the interests of [one's] own 
subjects, which is here carried too far"). For a more recent Dutch criticism, see De Winter, supra note 2, at 
706-07, 717 (calling Article 14 jurisdiction the "most disreputable" of the world's "chauvinistic" 
jurisdictional provisions). 
Indeed, the French themselves have often criticized Article 14 jurisdiction. See, e.g., BERNARD 
AUDIT, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 316-17 (3d ed. 2000) ( criticizing, while noting that the problem is not 
terribly serious). French scholars have questioned Article 14 almost from its inception, including in 
France's first treatise on private international law. See FOELIX, 'fRAirt DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 
213-14 (Paris, Joubert 1843) (arguing that Article 14 is an extraordinary measure). Later, Jean-Paulin 
Niboyet was a major critic during the early twentieth century, see J.-P. NIBOYET, MANUEL DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 888-89 (2d ed. 1928) (arguing that Article 14 was bad enough as written, but even 
worse in the broad way it was construed). Although he changed his views during the chaos of the 1930s 
and 1940s, see Nadelmann, supra note 2, at 322. Georges Droz is representative of modem France's 
moderate critics: the limited cure he proposes is to switch to domicile in order to eliminate the nationalist 
tone of Article 14 or to restrict the remedy to situations where property is in France (and maybe to limit the 
relief to that property). See Georges A.L. Droz, Reflexions pour une reforme des articles 14 et 15 du Code 
civil .fran,;ais, 64 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 1, 16-18 (1975). 
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This hypothetical clearly shows the inequity that can result from exorbitant 
jurisdiction. In so doing, the hypothetical works to suggest the U.S. motivation for 
seeking a treaty with the Europeans. In short, U.S. interests are being whipsawed: not 
only are U.S. citizens still subject, in theory, to the far-reaching jurisdiction of 
European courts and the wide recognition and enforceability of the resulting European 
judgments, but, in practice, U.S. judgments tend to receive short shrift in European 
courts. More broadly, Article 14 works nicely to sketch the legal context in which the 
recent negotiations on a world-wide convention transpired at The Hague. 
When invoking this illustration, U.S. commentators typically recognize that 
French law differs little from what most other nations accomplish through other 
exorbitant bases of jurisdiction. Moreover, they acknowledge that this illustration is 
an extreme one, seemingly without much importance in actual practice, because the 
French do not use or at least do not abuse their nationality-based jurisdiction all that 
often. 53 Still, as we can personally attest, some French commentators jump to counter-
attack any U.S. invocation of the illustration, no matter how qualified the invocation. 
The issue posed by such unpleasant confrontations is this: Even if Article 14 provides 
a useful illustration, is that nevertheless an unfair illustration? The answer is equivocal: 
Yes and ner-but mainly no. 
On the one hand, a close examination of French nationality-based jurisdiction, 
with comparison to other countries' practices, will make it look less shocking. Anyone 
who cites it for shock value is in the wrong. 
On the other hand, Article 14 exists and, going well beyond any appropriate 
jurisdiction for special situations, has real and pernicious effects. Like any exorbitant 
jurisdiction, then, it merits illustrative use in showing the need for international 
agreement to eliminate it. 
A. Past Use of Article 14 Jurisdiction 
1. Background for Jurisdictional Study 
As to jurisdiction, the civil law embraced the Roman idea of jurisdictional 
restraint, which reflected a spirit of fairness. 54 Actor sequitur forum rei was a Justinian 
maxim pronouncing that the plaintiff follows the defendant's forum. Generally, then, 
the civil law required the plaintiff to go to the forum at the defendant's domicile, and 
this forum could entertain any cause of action against the defendant regardless of 
where it arose. Eventually, there was an additional provision for long-arm-like 
jurisdiction in actions of tort, contract, and property, so that, for instance, a plaintiff 
could sue for a tort at the place of wrongful conduct. In other words, the civilian 
tradition somewhat differed, with telling consequences, from the U.S. tradition of tying 
jurisdiction to the power existing inside the sovereign's territorial boundaries. 
53. See, e.g.,FriedrichK. Juenger.A HagueJudgmentsConvention?,24 BROOK.J.INT'LL.111, 115-16 
( 1998) ( observing that anecdotal evidence suggests "European courts rarely render judgments against 
American citizens or enterprises that have no 'minimum contacts' with the foreign forum"); infra note 91. 
But see Russell, supra note 11, at 59-60, 78-80. 
54. See SCHI..ESINGER T AL., supra note at 3 79-80, 405, 413-34 (illustrating the difference between civil 
and common law); Friedrich Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the European 
Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1203-12 (1984). 
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France, of course, is a prototypical civil-law country in most respects, 55 including 
its civil procedure. 56 Modem French jurisdictional law accepts most of the civil-law 
ideas for its law applicable outside the coverage of the new European treaties. 57 
Domicile is thus the foundation of French jurisdiction. Yet socio-economic-political 
pressures similar to those prevailing in the United States, as well as the usual 
procedural policies of accuracy, fairness, and efficiency, have pushed France to reach 
defendants whose acts have caused harm in France. 
In its Article 14, however, France went much further, providing, "[a]n alien, 
though not residing in France, can be cited before the French courts, for the 
performance of obligations contracted by him in France with a Frenchman; he can be 
brought before French courts for obligations contracted by him in a foreign country 
toward Frenchmen." 58 
At first glance, this statute seems wordy, using two clauses to accomplish what 
it could have easily accomplished with one. In addition, the statute appears to reach 
only claims involving contracts between foreigners and French nationals. As it turns 
out, while the unnecessary wordiness does in fact exist, any limitation to contracts does 
not prevail. 
In order to understand Article 14' s convoluted structure, and in order to appreciate 
its full scope, we must turn to its legislative history, judicial interpretation, and treaty 
55. See generally JOHN BELL, FRENCH LEGAL CUL TURES (2001 ); JOHN BELL, SOPl-ilE BOYRON & SIMON 
WHITT AKER, PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LA w ( 1998); WALTER CAIRNS & ROBERT MCKEON, INTRODUCDON 
TO FRENCH LAW (1995); CHRISTIAN DADOMO & SUSAN FARRAN, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 
1996); BRICE DICKSON, INTRODUCDON TO FRENCH LAW (1994); CATHERINE ELLIOTT, CAROLE GEIRNAERT 
& FLORENCE HOUSSAIS, FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL LANGUAGE (1998); CATHERINE LLIOTT & 
CATHERINE VERNON, FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM (2000); FRANc;:OIS TERRE, INTRODUCDON GENERALE AU 
DROIT (1991); ANDREW WEST, YVON DESDEVISES, ALAIN FENET, DOMINIQUE GAURIER & MARIE-CLET 
HEUSSAFF, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1998); MARTIN WESTON, AN ENGLISH READER'S GUIDE 
TO THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM (1991); Claire M. Germain, French Law Guide, http://www.lawschool 
.comell.edu/library/encyclopedia/countries/france (last visited Aug. 15, 2005). A good source for actual 
French law, in French and English, appears at http://www.Iegifrance.gouv.fr/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2005). 
56. See generally PETER HERZOG & MARTHA WESER, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE (I 967); Thierry 
Bernard & Hedwige Vlasto, France, in 2 TRANSNATIONAL LmGATION: A PRAcnTIONER'S GUIDE (John 
Fellas ed., 2003); Robert W. Byrd & Christian Bouckaert, Trial and Court Procedures in France, in TRIAL 
AND COURT PROCEDURES WORLDWIDE 138 (Charles Platto ed., 1990); Kevin M. Clermont & Emily 
Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 24 7-5 I (2002); Christine 
Lecuyer-Thieffry, France, in INTERNATIONAL CML PROCEDURES 241 (Christian T. Campbell ed., 1995); 
Raymond Martin & Jacques Martin, France, in I INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: CIVIL 
PROCEDURE (Piet Taelman ed., 2002); Renee Y. Nauta & Gerard J. Meijer, French Civil Procedure, in 
ACCESS TO CIVIL PROCEDURE ABROAD 131 (Henk J. Snijders ed. & Benjamin Ruijsenaars trans., 1996). 
57. See NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCEDURE CMLE [N.C.P.C.] arts. 42-48; JEAN VINCENT & SERGE 
GUINCHARD, PROCEDURE CMLE 327-38, 354-55 (26th ed. 200 I); Bernard & Vlasto, supra note 56, at FRA-
10 to -22; Ucuyer-Thieffry, supra note 56, at 244-49 (comparing French rules with Anglo-American 
principles and explaining French rules of international jurisdiction); Nauta & Meijer, supra note 56, at 140, 
142. See infra Part ID.A.2.c for a discussion of the treaties' impact 
58. C. CIV. art. 14. This translation comes from Henry P. de Vries & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction 
in Personal Actions-A Comparison of Civil Law Views, 44 IOWA L. REV. 306,317 & n.45 (1959). The 
French reads, "L 'etranger, meme non residant en France, pou"a etre cite devant /es tribunaux franr;ais, 
pour /'execution des obligations par /ui contractees en France avec un Fran9ais; ii pou"a etre traduit 
devant /es tribunaux de France, pour /es obligations par /ui contractees en pays etranger envers des 
Fran9ais." 
HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 488 2006
488 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:2 
treatment. This will clarify that Article 14 jurisdiction is largely a court-made edifice 
built on a drafting error but lately extended by international agreement. 
2. History of the Code Provision 
a. Napoleon 's Contribution 
Article 14 was an innovation of Bonaparte's Civil Code of 1804.59 The Code 
attempted to unify the array of ordinances and customs in force in different parts of 
France, including those relating to international jurisdiction. 60 One basis of jurisdiction 
that existed in some parts of France at that time was jurisdiction to attach or garnish 
the assets of foreign debtors and even to secure a judgment against those assets in 
some cases.61 The impulse underlying this old basis of so-called forum arresti jurisdic-
tion-the desire to let one's own people sue at home when enforcement is possible 
there-appears to have provided at least part of the inspiration driving Article 14.62 
The other part of the inspiration behind Article 14 appears to have been the fear 
that French nationals would be unable to receive fair treatment in foreign courts. This 
was a time when all of Europe not under French domination was at war with France. 
Beyond Europe lay barbarism to French eyes. For the French, suing at home before 
French judges seemed far preferable to seeking justice abroad-indeed, it seemed 
naturally just. 63 
Interestingly, however, unrestrained pursuit of such broad aims was not evident 
in the original draft of what ultimately came to be Article 14. The version initially 
considered by the Conseil d'Etat read: 
An alien, though not residing in France, can be cited before the French courts, for the 
performance of obligations contracted by him in France with a Frenchman; and if he 
is found in France, he can be brought before French courts for obligations contracted 
by him in a foreign country toward Frenchmen. 64 
59. See generally JEAN-l.oUIS HALPERIN, THE CML CODE (David W. Gruning trans., 2000). There has 
been some debate as to whether French courts could assert jurisdiction based on the plaintiff's nationality 
prior to the Civil Code. See Nadelmann, supra note 2, at 323. The currently accepted view is that this 
jurisdictional basis was not generally available then. See HELENE GAUDEMET-TALLON, RECHERCHES SUR 
LES ORIGINES DEL' ARTICLE 14 DU CODE CIVIL 43-52 ( 1964), reviewed by Kurt H. Nadelmann, Book Review, 
14AM. J. COMP. L. 348 (1965). 
60. See GAUDEMET-TALLON, supra note 59, at 75-86; Alain Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code 
Porta/is?, 43 TuL. L. REV. 762, 762-63 (1969); Charles Sumner Lobingier, Napoleon and His Code, 32 
HARv.L.REV.114, ll5, 120-21 (1918). 
61. See Nadelmann, supra note 2, at 324-26 (noting that this basis of jurisdiction was available in many 
French cities, including Paris, as early as 1134, and that in 1580 it appeared in the Custom of Paris arts. 173 
& 174). 
62. See OAUDEMET-TALLON,supra note 59, at 69-74. 
63. See id at 52-58; Louis Rigaud, La conception nationa/iste de la competence judiciaire en Droit 
international prive: sa persistance et ses origines, 33 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 605, 606 
(1938). 
64. See 1 P.A. FENET, RECUEIL COMPLET DES TRA VAUX PREPARATOIRES DUCODE CIVIL 12 (Otto Zeller 
1968) ( 1827) ( emphasis added). The French reads: 
L 'etranger, meme non residant en France. peut etre cite devant /es tribunauxfrallfais, pour 
/'execution des obligations par lui contractees en France avec un Frallfais; et s'il est trouve 
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In other words, the draft did not provide for jurisdiction based merely on the 
plaintiff's nationality, but instead contained two different bases of jurisdiction, logi-
cally separated into two clauses. The first clause provided for jurisdiction based on the 
forum-directed act of incurring a contractual obligation in France. The second clause 
provided for what might be viewed as a limited form of jurisdiction based on physical 
presence: if the defendant is contractually obligated to a French national, then the 
French courts may base jurisdiction on the defendant's transient presence in France. 
For unknown reasons, the key phrase in the draft-"and if he is found in 
France"-did not make it into the final version. 65 While one is left guessing as to how 
this occurred, the drafting history does, at least, explain Article 14's convoluted 
structure, which has remained unchanged for two hundred years. 
b. The Doctrine's Development 
One might be tempted to read the murky Article 14 narrowly. One might, for 
instance, assume that it should apply only to contract disputes, or that the defendant 
must have incurred obligations directly to the French plaintiff. This is not so. In a 
series of cases beginning in 1808,66 the French courts have interpreted the code 
provision expansively, such that it now merely requires a person currently holding any 
right to sue to be a French national at the time of commencing suit.67 Thus, in our 
hypothetical above, Professor Blanc-Jouvan could sue Professor Sherwin in France for 
a tort arising entirely in New York. 68 This would be so even if Blanc-Jouvan were 
domiciled in New York.69 Moreover, if Sherwin got into a car accident with anyone 
who happened to have a French insurer, the French insurer could sue her in France. 70 
en France, ii peut etre traduit devant les tribunaux de France, meme pour des obligations 
contractees par lui en pays etranger envers des Franr,:ais. 
Id.; see also de Vries & Lowenfeld, supra note 58, at 318 & n.47. 
65. See 7 FENET, supra note 64, at 606, 622; FOELIX, supra note 52, at 215 & n.2 (noting that the clause 
was removed after discussion between the Conseil d 'Etat and the Tribunat); GAUDEMET-T ALLON,supra note 
59, at 75 ("un inexplicable accident de redaction"); deVries & Lowenfeld, supra note 58, at 318 & n.47; 
Nadelmann, supra note 2, at 323. 
66. lngelheim v. Fridberg, Cass. req., Sept. 7, 1808, 2 S. Jur. l, 579 (holding that there is no difference 
between "cite," in the first clause of Article 14, and "traduit," in its second clause, and that therefore French 
courts can take jurisdiction over alien defendants regardless of where they have incurred their obligations 
to French nationals). 
67. See generally AUDIT, supra note 52, at 315-26; 2 DELAUME, supra note 45, §§ 8.02-8.05; YVON 
LoUSSOUARN & PIERRE BOUREL, 0ROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 491-93 (4th ed. 1993); PIERRE MAYER, 
DROITINTERNATIONALPRIVE 198-203 (4th ed. 1991); deVries & Lowenfeld, supra note 58, at 318-30. 
68. See Cie du Brittannia v. Cie du Phenix, Cass. req., Dec. 13, 1842, 43 S. Jur. I, 14 (interpreting 
Article 14's "obligations par lui contractees" to include tort obligations incurred when an English ship 
collided with a French ship on the high seas). 
69. See Bertin v. de Bagration, Cass. civ., Jan. 26, 1836, 36 S. Jur. l, 217. 
70. See Cie La Metropole v. Soc. Muller, Cass. le civ., Mar. 21, 1966, D. 1966, 429; see also Wieldon 
v. Hebert, Cass. req., Aug. 18, 1856, 57 S. Jur. I, 586 (Fr.) (allowing suit by the French holder of a 
negotiable instrument, even though the instrument was originally made out to an alien); Forman & Cie v. 
Pugh, Cass. civ., Mar. 9, 1863, 63 S. Jur. I, 225 (allowing suit by a French widow for debts owed to her 
deceased husband, even though the husband had not been a French national, and even though she had not 
herself been a French national during the marriage). Corporations as well as individuals can invoke Article 
14. SeeAUDIT,supranote52,at319. 
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If Sherwin were a domiciliary of France or had some other significant link to 
France, or if Blanc-Jouvan were a member of some disadvantaged group, then 
France's asserting jurisdiction would not seem so unreasonable, and could even be 
accomplished using one of France's now multifold bases of international jurisdiction. 
The real significance of Article 14, then, lies in settings where no such special 
justification exists. Indeed, the French courts now see Article 14 as applying only 
when no other jurisdictional basis exists. 71 
When interpreting Article 14, the courts often appear to focus their reasoning on 
legislative intent. The Cour de cassation held early on that the legislature clearly 
intended to undercut the principle of actor sequitur forum rei when it adopted the code 
provision. 72 Subsequent cases involved textual analysis also, with broad readings given 
to such key phrases as "obligations contracted by him"73 and ''toward Frenchmen." 74 
To the extent that the courts have articulated a policy justification for their expansive 
readings, they appear to have followed some of the same impulses that initially 
inspired the statute. In an early holding that the French plaintiff need not be domiciled 
in France, the Cour de cassation reasoned that the statute was designed to protect the 
foreign commerce of French nationals. 75 A leading French treatise today infers that the 
courts' justification must be that French courts should always be open to French 
nationals, perhaps because all foreign courts do not offer sufficient guarantees of 
justice. 76 
This is not to say that Article 14 jurisdiction has no limits, for the courts have 
carved out some exceptions. It does not apply in real property actions when the 
immovable property lies abroad 77 or in cases that require foreign official action. 78 More 
significantly, it does not apply when the French plaintiff has clearly renounced the 
privilege of invoking it in a particular case, either expressly or impliedly. This 
renunciation can come in advance by contract, such as by including a forum selection 
or arbitration clause, or after the fact by an act, such as choosing to sue abroad on the 
claim. 79 Finally, Article 14 jurisdiction is overridden in some cases by particular 
treaties, which include not only specialized treaties such as the old Warsaw 
Convention on air transportation 80 but also the general agreements known as the 
Brussels Regulation 81 and the Lugano Convention. 82 
71. See AUDIT, supra note 52, at 300-01, 317 (citing sources); MAYER, supra note 67, at 201; H. 
Gaudemet-Tallon, Nationalisme et competence judiciaire: dee/in ou renouveau?, 1987-1988 TRA VAUX DU 
COMITE FRANc;:AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 171, 177 ( 1989). 
72. See Ingelheim v. Fridberg, Cass. req., Sept. 7, 1808, 2 S. Jur. I, 579. 
73. See Cie du Brittannia v. Cie du Phenix, Cass. req., Dec. 13, 1842, 43 S. Jur. I, 14; see also Industrie 
fran~aise v. Rydes & Cie, Cass. civ., Aug. 12, 1872, 72 S. Jur. I, 323. 
74. See Arnold v. Fontaine, Cass. vac., Sept. 25, 1829, 9 S. Jur. I, 373. 
75. See Bertin v. de Bagration, Cass. civ., Jan. 26, 1836,36 S. Jur. I, 217. 
76. AUDIT, supra note 52, at 315 ("que /es nationaux devraient toujours pouvoir demander justice 
devant /es tribunaux fran(:ais; ou encore que /es tribunaux de tous /es pays n "offeent pas des garanties 
suffisantes"). 
77. See id. at 318 (citing modem sources). 
78. See id at 318-19 ( citing modem sources). 
79. See id at 322-25 (citing modem sources); MAYER, supra note 67, at 202-03. 
80. See HERZOG & WESER, supra note 56, at 196 & n.168; GEORGETIE MILLER, LIABILITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL IR TRANSPORT 293 ( 1977). 
81. Commission Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, as amended2002 0.1. (L 225) I [hereinafter 
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c. The Brussels Regulation's Impact 
The Brussels Regulation, along with the similar Lugano Convention, deserves 
special attention not only because ofits broad substantive application to ordinary kinds 
oflitigation and because ofits wide territorial application in Europe, 83 but also because 
it expands Article 14 jurisdiction while abrogating it within the Brussels and Lugano 
world. 
From the point of view of a U.S. defendant like Professor Sherwin in our 
hypothetical, the most frightening thing about these two agreements is that they expose 
her property all over Europe to the risk of seizure if a judgment is entered against her 
in France. Prior to these agreements, she might not have cared so much about being 
sued by Professor Blanc-Jouvan in a French court on the basis of Article 14 
jurisdiction. Because other countries would have refused to enforce any resulting 
judgment, she would have risked losing only property in France. If her heavily 
mortgaged pied-a-te"e in Paris was falling apart anyway, she might have simply 
ignored the suit, and spent her summers at the villa in Tuscany or the chalet in the 
Swiss Alps instead. With the Brussels and Lugano scheme in effect, however, Sherwin 
had better defend and win in the French court, or else she can kiss both the Tuscan 
villa and the Swiss chalet goodbye. For while France can no longer use Article 14 
jurisdiction against domiciliaries of fellow signatories to the Brussels and Lugano 
agreements, 84 France can still use it against defendants domiciled elsewhere. 85 And 
France's fellow signatory countries must give effect to French judgments, even those 
based on Article 14 jurisdiction if rendered against an outsider. 86 
Another effect of the Brussels Regulation is to extend the remaining privilege of 
suing in French courts based on Article 14 jurisdiction to all domiciliaries of France, 
not just French nationals. 87 While jurisdiction based on the plaintiff's domicile, or so-
called forum actoris, may be somewhat less shocking than the old for nationaliste 
franr;ais, it does, of course, broaden the pool of potential plaintiffs that Sherwin needs 
to watch out for. 88 Indeed, the Article 14 privilege still remains available to French 
nationals domiciled abroad. 89 
Brussels Regulation]. On the preceding Brussels Convention, see ALAN DASHWOOD, RICHARD HACON & 
ROBIN WHITE, A GUIDE TO THE CML JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS CONVENTION ( 1987). 
82. The Lugano Convention extended the Brussels Convention scheme to the EFT A countries and today 
still offers an avenue for other countries to affiliate with the Brussels regime. See PETER STONE, CIVIL 
JURISDICTION A D JUDGMENTS IN EUROPE 4-6, 25-28 ( 1998). 
83. See Brussels Regulation, supra note 81, ch. I; infra text accompanying notes 130-132. 
84. See Brussels Regulation, supra note 81, art. 3. 
85. See id. art. 4(1). 
86. See id. ch. m. 
87. See id. art. 4(2); Droz, supra note 52, at 8. 
88. On the use of forum actoris jurisdiction by other countries, see infra text accompanying note 148. 
89. See Droz, supra note 52, at 8. 
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B. Current Use of Article 14 Jurisdiction 
1. Limited Uses 
[Vol. 58:2 
For all of the criticism that Article 14 suffers in academic circles, 90 one could be 
forgiven for assuming that it is regularly used to bludgeon unsuspecting foreign 
defendants, and U.S. defendants in particular. In fact, Article 14 appears not to be 
regularly invoked in practice. 91 That is, while Article 14 makes a French forum 
generally available to the French, they nonetheless may end up not invoking that 
forum-for any of a number of reasons. 
First, and foremost, French plaintiffs today need not, and indeed cannot, invoke 
Article 14 when another ofFrance's now multifold bases of international jurisdiction 
applies.92 Obviously, then, Article 14 jurisdiction has faded into the background. 
Second, even when Article 14 is the French plaintiffs' only hope, a French forum 
may be unavailable in a particular case. As noted above,93 French courts have held that 
the code provision does not apply to actions involving immovable property located 
outside of France, to claims requiring foreign official action, or to cases controlled by 
certain treaties. Even if the case does not fall within one of these categories, the 
French plaintiff may have already renounced jurisdictional privileges, for instance, by 
contract. Indeed, to the extent that Article 14 poses a risk to foreigners who deal with 
90. See supra note 52. 
91. Although we lack empirical data with which to support this proposition, we can offer some 
circumstantial evidence. To begin with, a number of other commentators offer anecdotal evidence that 
Article 14 jurisdiction is rarely invoked against U.S. defendants. See Juenger, supra note 53, at 115-16 
("[T]he concededly anecdotal evidence I have been able to collect by reading foreign cases and literature 
suggests that European courts rarely render judgments against American citizens or enterprises that have 
no 'minimum contacts' with the foreign forum."); Juenger, supra note 54, at 1212 ("[T]here is no indication 
in reported decisions to suggest that the Brussels Convention's jurisdictional discrimination has posed much 
of a practical problem."); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Thoughts About a Multinational Judgments Convention: 
A Reaction to the von Mehren Report, LA w & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1994, at 289, 303 (indicating that 
the author had heard ofno cases in which a judgment based on exorbitant jurisdiction was enforced against 
an American defendant's European assets under the Brussels Convention); Weintraub I, supra note 21, at 
172 ("There is no evidence that [the E. U. countries' exorbitant bases of jurisdiction] are being used against 
U.S. defendants .... "). 
Furthermore, a search of all U.S. federal and state court decisions reported on Westlaw turned up 
only six cases that even discuss French Article I 4 jurisdiction, and these do so only in passing. See 
Souffront v. Compagnie des Sucreries, 217 U.S. 475,483 n.1 (1910); Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 86 F. 
Supp. 2d 95, 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Nippon Emo-Trans Co. v. Emo-Trans, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1215, 1226, 
1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F. Supp. 161, 165 n.6 
(E.D. Pa. 1970), affd, 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971); Scott v. Middle E. Airlines Co., 240 F. Supp. I, 4 n.7 
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Mitchell v. Garrett, 10 Del. (5 Houst.) 34, 44-45 (Del. Super. Ct. 1875). These are the only 
cases that mention Article 14 jurisdiction, by name or otherwise, among the total of 168 cases retrieved from 
Westlaw's "ALLCASES" and "ALL CASES-OLD" databases on June 24, 2003, using the following search 
terms: [Gurisdiction! Is (france french france's) Is defendant Is foreign!) (("art. 14" "article 14") Is (france 
french france's "code civil" "civil code" "c. civ." "civ. c."))]. None of them involves a dispute over the 
effects of a French judgment rendered on such basis of jurisdiction. While this is by no means conclusive, 
one would expect that if U.S. defendants were regularly subjected to Article 14 jurisdiction, there would be 
at least some published opinions concerning the effects of the resulting judgments in the United States. 
92. See sources cited supra note 71. 
93. See supra Part m.A.2.b. 
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French people via contract and who are in a position to bargain over terms, one should 
expect to see these foreigners insisting that their French associates contractually waive 
their jurisdictional privileges. 94 
Third, even in the situation where French plaintiffs could obtain a French forum, 
they may choose to avoid that forum and instead sue in foreign courts for reasons of 
convenience. 95 The French plaintiff may already reside in the foreign country or, in the 
case of a corporation, may have a branch office there. Witnesses and evidence may be 
concentrated in the foreign country. If the dispute is expected to involve foreign law 
regardless of forum, the plaintiff may want to hire foreign lawyers and may calculate 
that they will be more effective in their own courts. If there are potential plaintiffs of 
other nationalities involved, the French plaintiff may want to join with them or share 
representation and cost, and a foreign court may be the best forum to meet everyone's 
interests. 
Fourth, French plaintiffs may choose to sue in a foreign court because of a 
perceived legal or other advantage. 96 The French plaintiff may prefer a foreign court's 
choice-of-law rules, which may point to favorable causes of action and generous 
remedies. The plaintiff may prefer the foreign court's procedural rules, such as the 
availability of discovery devices and jury trials. The plaintiff may also prefer the rules 
and practices of the legal profession in the foreign jurisdiction, and may be especially 
drawn to contingency fee arrangements and nonreimbursement of fees. Finally, the 
plaintiff may perceive that the foreign court is favorably biased or prone to give out 
large damage awards. Many of these considerations are particularly relevant for 
plaintiffs choosing between a French court and a U.S. court. 97 Indeed, it is often U.S. 
94. Of course, the foreigners must know of the danger. See GEORGES R. DELAUME, AMERICAN-FRENCH 
PRivATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 {1953) (warning that Article 14 is "a legal trap into which foreigners, 
unaware of the existence of the privilege, may fall"). 
95. See, e.g., Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(involving plaintiffs from all over Europe and the United States who may have found the United States to 
be the most convenient forum in which to join suits); Jackson v. Coggan, 330 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 
1971) (involving a French plaintiff who was living and working in New York and who sued a U.S. 
defendant in New York over a car accident that had occurred while the two were visiting France); De 
Sairigne v. Gould, 83 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 177 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1949) (involving 
successful forum non conveniens motion). 
96. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Off Long Island NY, on July 17, 1996, 65 F. Supp. 2d 207 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999) (involving a large number of French plaintiffs suing two U.S. corporations, Boeing and TWA); 
Grimandi v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 512 F. Supp. 764 (D. Kan. 1981) (involving air crash in France). In Air 
Crash Off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 212, the plaintiffs argued that the Warsaw Convention prevented 
them from suing in France. This appears to have been a weak argument, however, because they offered 
meager evidence to support it, and because the defendants were doing everything possible to move the 
lawsuit to France, including consenting to suit there. See id. at 210, 2 I 2. 
97. Accurate or not, there is clearly a perception that U.S. courts provide a favorable forum for 
European plaintiffs. One German scholar characterizes U.S. courts as "the plaintiff's heaven." Peter F. 
Schlosser, Lectures on Civil-Law Litigation Systems and American Cooperation with Those Systems, 45 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 9, 37 (1996). Citing contingency fees and sympathetic juries, Lord Denning writes: "As a moth 
is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he can only get his case into their courts, 
he stands to win a fortune." Smith Kline& French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] I W.L.R. 730, 733 (Eng. C.A. 
1982). 
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defendants who are the ones fighting to get into French courts, and French plaintiffs 
who are the ones fighting to get into U.S. courts.98 
Fifth, and significantly, French plaintiffs may determine that while Article 14 
ultimately makes a French forum available, any resulting judgment would have limited 
value because courts outside of France would refuse to enforce it. Leaving aside the 
Brussels Regulation and Lugano Convention, a judgment rendered solely on the basis 
of Article 14 jurisdiction will generally not be enforceable outside of France. 99 In fact, 
courts outside of France are prone to cite this code provision as the paradigmatic 
example of exorbitant jurisdiction that is unworthy of international recognition. 100 
Indeed, it is probably because foreign courts are so hostile to this basis of jurisdiction 
that one seldom hears parties mention it outside of France. In short, if the French 
plaintiff wants a judgment that will be enforceable abroad and has no basis of 
jurisdiction in France other than Article 14, the plaintiff will likely sue directly in the 
foreign forum in which enforcement is desired. 
Consequently, when Article 14 jurisdiction is invoked, the case typically involves 
a status suit such as a matrimonial matter 101 or, more importantly for our purposes, a 
situation where the defendant has assets in France (or now, under the Brussels 
Regulation and Lugano Convention, in Europe ).102 
This point about assets not only illustrates the continued link between Article 14 
jurisdiction and the forum arresti jurisdiction that inspired it, but also goes a long way 
toward explaining the continued existence of Article 14 jurisdiction. 103 When the 
French government began a project to reform the Civil Code at the end of the 1940s, 
the question arose whether to scrap Article 14. The commission in charge of the effort 
decided against doing so based in part on the assumption that plaintiffs invoke such 
jurisdiction in practice only when the defendant has property in France. 104 The 
president of the commission noted that the benefit of Article 14 jurisdiction is that it 
allows French courts to hear cases in which French interests are involved. 105 He 
continued: 
98. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Off Long Island NY, on July 17, 1996, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 209; Grimandi 
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 512 F. Supp. at 777-81; De Sairigne v. Gould, 83 F. Supp. at 271. 
99. See, e.g., Schibsby v. Westenholz, (1870) 6 L.R.Q.B. 155, 163 (Eng.) (refusing to enforce a French 
judgment rendered on the basis of Article 14 jurisdiction). 
100. See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F. Supp. 161, 165 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 
1970), ajf'd, 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971). 
IOI. See Droz, supra note 52, at 5-7 (approving of this use of Article 14); Gaudemet-Tallon, supra note 
71, at 178-80. This use does not result because the judgments from status suits will necessarily receive 
greater recognition abroad. Rather, it results because French plaintiffs in such suits often care about the 
effects only in France. See GEORGES R. DELAUME, AMERICAN-FRENCH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 170 
(2d ed. 1961). But cf AUDIT, supra note 52, at 317 ("ii reste que /'application de la regle est plus 
contestable dans /es relations de famille entre personnes de nationalite differente"). 
I 02. See Nadelmann, supra note 2, at 327; supra Part ill.A.2.c. 
I 03. Of course, other explanations circulate. For example, some believe that the French preserve Article 
14 in order to have something to surrender in international negotiations on jurisdiction and judgments. See 
Gaudemet-Tallon, supra note 71, at 176 (criticizing this explanation). 
I 04. See Nadelmann, supra note 2, at 327; Kurt H. Nadelmann & Arthur T. von Mehren, Some Remarks 
on the Proposed Codification: The Draft of the Commission for the Reform of the Civil Code, I AM. J. 
COMP. L. 407,415 (1952) (translating part of the exchange). 
105. See Nadelmann & von Mehren, supra note 104, at 415. 
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It can be taken for granted that the judgment will not be given an exequatur in the 
foreign country, but the rule is of practical importance when the alien has property 
in France. 
The fact that the stranger has property in France justifies, to a certain extent, the 
taking of jurisdiction by French courts; it makes it possible to avoid the delays and 
complications involved in getting an exequatur for a foreign judgment. Therefore, a 
valid reason exists for maintaining the principle. 106 
495 
Viewed in this light, Article 14 jurisdiction is really not that different from what 
other countries accomplish in other ways. 107 Reconsider the exorbitant jurisdiction of 
the United States. 108 Transient jurisdiction arose from historical and conceptual roots, 
and accordingly proved a clumsy means to any chauvinist ends. Because the presence 
basis for transient jurisdiction proved ineffective in this regard, attachment jurisdiction 
developed to ensure favored plaintiffs with the ability to sue and enforce locally-in 
fact, attachment jurisdiction was usually very inclusive with respect to who could 
invoke it. More recently, as restrictions on quasi in rem jurisdiction have multiplied, 
doing-business jurisdiction stepped in to fill the perceived need for plaintiffs to sue 
foreigners locally when assets are present. Here, the doing-business basis is an 
oversized form of exorbitant jurisdiction in terms of its remedy too, generating as it 
does a judgment that runs against the person of the defendant. Despite variations, each 
country's exorbitant jurisdiction at the core exhibits a concern with allowing its own 
people to sue at home when they can recover at home, which is usually much easier 
than suing abroad. 109 
For a closer analogy, Article 14 acts as a form of general jurisdiction that is in 
personam but based in practice on assets in France--a form much like Germany's 
property-based jurisdiction, which we shall soon discuss. 110 But the French form is 
explicitly restricted to certain plaintiffs, yet legally enforceable even if the first assets 
appear in France only after judgment. In sum, Article 14 is basically similar to other 
countries' exorbitances, except that it is more nationalistic in expressing who can 
invoke it and that it does not utilize the subterfuge of expressly linking to property in 
France or to some other defendant contact. 
106. Id. 
107. See LoUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 67, at 490-91; Droz, supra note 52, at 3-5. 
I 08. See supra Part II. 
109. In a well-known essay on this subject, Kurt Nadelrnann argued that the French rely on Article 14 
jurisdiction as a substitute (albeit an imperfect one) for attachment jurisdiction. In other words, because the 
French have not maintained jurisdictional rules that allow plaintiffs to sue foreign property in France in 
order to satisfy unrelated obligations, they keep this overly broad basis of jurisdiction that allows the same 
result in practice. See Nadelrnann, supra note 2, at 324. Our point is slightly different. We suggest that 
rather than existing specifically to fill in for attachment jurisdiction, Article 14 exists to serve the same 
underlying desire that attachment jurisdiction and most other exorbitant bases of jurisdiction exist to serve: 
the desire of courts to let their own people sue at home when they can do so effectively. See De Winter, 
supra note 2, at 716-17. 
110. See infra Part IV. 
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2. Extensive Effects 
So perhaps Article 14 mainly sounds bad,just as do U.S. transient and attachment 
jurisdictional bases. There is, after all, a long tradition of foreigners' overemphasis of 
"exorbitant" jurisdictional bases. Certainly the French pick on U.S. jurisdictional 
bases. So U.S. commentators in picking on Article 14 may simply be taking advantage 
of France's poor phrasing of its brand of exorbitant jurisdiction. 
It may be, on the other hand, that Article 14 's flaws extend beyond the tone of its 
phrasing. After all, French plaintiffs do sometimes use it to go after foreigners' assets, 
and they surely use it for settlement pressure in many more cases. 111 Such forum 
arresti jurisdiction, when invoked or threatened against a defendant having no other 
contacts with the forum and on a claim wholly unrelated to the assets, is not especially 
fair-particularly today when, under modem jurisdictional law, it is not especially 
needed by deserving plaintiffs. 112 Therein lies the reason that the Brussels Regulation 
outlaws the United Kingdom's version ofattachmentjurisdiction.1 13 
Furthermore, to the extent that Article 14 jurisdiction tries to play the role of 
forum arresti jurisdiction, it clearly is an oversized and clumsy substitute. Although 
Article 14 jurisdiction may, in practice, be used mostly against defendants with local 
assets, it is by no means limited to such defendants as a matter of law. And whereas 
a judgment obtained on the basis of forum arresti jurisdiction reaches only the attached 
or garnished assets, the French judgment purports to bind the defendant personally. 
In fact, the mere existence of Article 14 jurisdiction may have stunted France's 
development of more refined and precise bases of jurisdiction. As during the reform 
debates at the end of the 1940s, the operation of the code provision may have long 
given the legislature the sense that there was no need to act. And the courts until 
recently tended to look to Article 14 jurisdiction before looking at other bases of 
jurisdiction, thus failing to address the other bases and delineate their scope. 114 
In this respect, the current judicial approach of relying on Article 14 only as a last 
resort 115 may be an improvement. But from the perspective of a foreign defendant, the 
current approach may be disadvantageous. Given the choice between a French 
judgment entered on the basis of Article 14 and a French judgment entered on some 
other basis of jurisdiction, a foreign defendant should prefer the former, as it renders 
more promising a collateral attack upon any attempted enforcement outside of Europe. 
Today, French courts must search out another basis of jurisdiction when possible, but 
111. See Nadelrnann, supra note 2, at 327. 
112. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977) (holding ordinary use of attachment 
jurisdiction unreasonable as a constitutional matter, but leaving open its use in some cases against 
foreigners); Kevin M. Clermont, Restating Te"itorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 
66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 426 ( 1981 ). 
113. See Brussels Regulation, supra note 81, annex I. A more subtle criticism of Article 14 is that a 
French plaintiff who has chosen first to sue abroad may take advantage of the code provision to avoid res 
judicata when suing anew at home, arguing that the earlier suit was not really voluntary because suing 
abroad was necessary to chase assets and so did not constitute a waiver. See AUDIT, supra note 52, at 324-
25; Droz, supra note 52, at 19-21; supra Part ill.A.2.b. In addition to being unfair to the defendant, this 
loophole would seem to burden France's judicial resources wastefully. 
114. See Nadelrnann, supra note 2, at 326-27 (making this point with regard to the saisie foraine 
jurisdiction that used to appear in the French Code of Civil Procedure). 
115. See supra note 71. 
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in that process they may be marginally more willing to uphold that other basis of 
jurisdiction because they know that Article 14 exists as a backup. When the plaintiff 
seeks to enforce the resulting judgment abroad, the foreign court will see a 
nonexorbitant basis of jurisdiction underlying the judgment, and further may be 
unwilling to reexamine the factual support for this basis, and so will tend to enforce 
the judgment. Article 14 jurisdiction may in this way lurk in the background of 
numerous cases, causing harmful effects that are not readily apparent. 
As an illustration of the shadow cast by Article 14 jurisdiction, consider the recent 
and celebrated litigation in Paris against Yahoo!, the U.S. internet corporation. Two 
French nonprofit organizations sued Yahoo! for allowing access through its auction 
site to Nazi-related propaganda and memorabilia, the display for sale of which is 
illegal in France. 116 The court ordered Yahoo! to block access by French users. 117 
Although the physical location of Yahoo!' s conduct was outside France, the court had 
based jurisdiction on Article 46 of the New Code of Civil Procedure, relying on the 
fact that Yahoo!'s conduct had caused effects in France. 118 This sparked an uproar in 
the internet community and a veritable flood of law journal commentary. 119 Among 
other things, commentators focused on how territorial jurisdiction doctrines should 
apply to the internet, 120 and some were quick to suggest that there was an insufficient 
connection between Yahoo! and France to warrant jurisdiction under the effects test 
of Article 46. 121 While this is a debatable point, what they entirely missed was that 
even if Article 46 did not apply, the French court could have simply asserted 
jurisdiction under Article 14 of the Civil Code. The commentary reads as if the advent 
of the internet, combined with a new reading of Article 46, suddenly allowed French 
courts to judge a U.S. citizen with whom they had few contacts. 122 As we know, of 
116. See Assignation [Summons], Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.J [ordinary court of original 
jurisdiction) Paris, Apr. 12, 2000 (No. 00/05308), available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/ 
tgiparis20000522-asg.htm#texte. 
117. See Ordonnance [Order], T.G.J. Paris, May 22, 2000 (No. 00/05308), available at 
http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522.htm#texte, translation available at http://www. 
juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/yauctions20000522.htm, confirmed on reconsideration, Ordonnance T .G.I. Paris, 
Nov. 20, 2000 (No. 00/05308), available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/ tgiparis20001120.pdf, 
translation available at http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/20001120yahoofrance.pdf. On the unsuc-
cessful, related criminal case, see Scarlet Pruitt, Yahoo Freed in Nazi Memorabilia Case, PCWORLD.COM, 
Feb. 11, 2003, http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/O,aid,109307,00.asp. 
118. See N.C.P.C. art. 46. 
119. For references to much of this commentary and a brief overview of the major issues raised, see 
Mathias Reimann, Introduction: The Yahoo! Case and Conflict of Laws in the Cyberage, 24 MICH. J. INT'L 
L. 663, 668 n.21, 665- 72 (2003). 
120. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002); Margaret 
Khayat Bratt & Norbert F. Kugele, Who's in Charge?, MICH. B.J., July 2001, at 43; Brendon Fowler, Cara 
Franklin & Bob Hyde, Can You Yahoo!? The Internet's Digital Fences, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12, 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2001dltr0012.htm1; Daniel Arthur Lapres, Of Yahoos and 
Dilemmas, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 409 (2002); Caitlin T. Murphy, Note, International Law and the Internet: An 
Ill-Suited Match, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 405 (2002). See generally CLERMONT, supra note 
52, at 43-4 7. 
121. See Fowler et al., supra note 120, atfl 7-9; Lapres, supra note 120, at 418,427; Murphy, supra note 
120, at 415-16. 
122. See Fowler et al., supra note 120, at fl 7-9; Lapres, supra note 120, at 418, 427; Murphy, supra note 
120, at 415-16. 
HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 498 2006
498 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:2 
course, for two hundred years French courts have been able to judge a U.S. citizen 
with whom they had no contacts whatsoever. 
This point may not have been lost on Yahoo!, which challenged jurisdiction in the 
French trial court, but then declined to appeal the trial court's adverse decision. 123 
While Yahoo! may have declined because it considered the jurisdictional challenge 
weak under Article 46, it also may have declined because it recognized that Article 14 
was lurking in the background, ready to step in the moment Article 46 wavered. While 
a judgment based on Article 14 would have been easier to collaterally attack in a U.S. 
court, Yahoo! already had a strong First Amendment argument on which to base such 
an attack. Instead of sinking its resources into a French appeal, it made limited 
attempts to comply with the French order and then sought a judgment from a U.S. 
court declaring that the French order would be unenforceable in the United States. 124 
Concededly, this was a case in which there was an arguable basis of jurisdiction 
besides Article 14. What would have been the effect of Article 14 if the alternative 
basis had been weaker? Very likely Yahoo!-as well as Yahoo!'s liability insurer-
still would have been in a difficult situation and so would have been inclined to defend 
in France. There still would have been a risk that the French court would assert the 
weak alternative basis of jurisdiction, knowing it had Article 14 as a backup, and thus 
render a judgment that might then be enforced in the United States. 
Even if the French court had been asserting only Article 14 jurisdiction, the 
resulting judgment still could have been harmful. First, while Article 14 does tend to 
raise a red flag in U.S. courts, it remains possible that a U.S. court would enforce an 
Article 14 judgment if the facts supported an alternative but unarticulated jurisdictional 
basis recognized by the United States. In other words, if the U.S. court were to find 
that jurisdiction over the defendant did not offend due process, then it might enforce 
the French judgment even though it expressly rested on Article 14.125 Second, even 
123. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 8 n.11, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme 
et, l'Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (indicating that Yahoo! did not appeal the Paris 
court's final order); Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 
I 188 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that Yahoo! withdrew its appeal of the Paris court's initial order, and did not 
appeal its final order). 
124. Yahoo! successfully induced the U.S. court to exercise jurisdiction over the two French defendants. 
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et I' Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1174, 1176, 1180 
(N.D. Cal. 2001) (questionably finding that defendants' California-directed acts constituted minimum 
contacts and that personal jurisdiction was not unreasonable). Yahoo! then obtained the declaratory 
judgment at the trial court level. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 169 F. 
Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (granting Yahoo!'s motion for summary judgment). See Ayelet Ben-Ezer 
& Ariel L. Bendor, Conceptualizing Yahoo! v. L.C.R.A.: Private Law, Constitutional Review, and 
International Conflict of Laws, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089 (2004). However, a three-judge panel of the 
court of appeals reversed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et 
I' Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004). See Louise Ellen Teitz, Both Sides of the Coin: A Decade 
of Parallel Proceedings and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Transnational Litigation, 10 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. I, 36-40 (2004). Now, the court of appeals reversed the district court by cobbling 
together minorities of judges who felt either that personal jurisdiction was lacking or that the case was not 
yet ripe. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, No. 01-17424, 2006 WL60670 (9th 
Cir. Jan. 12, 2006). 
125. See Nippon Emo-Trans Co. v. Emo-Trans, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1215, 1230-31 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIIE UNITED STATES § 482 cmt. c (1987); 
DELAIJME,supra note 101, at l 70&n.744; RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 803 n.2 (4th ed. 
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aside from this uncertainty over future U.S. enforcement, any U.S. defendant would 
want to avoid becoming a judgment debtor entirely. An unpaid judgment adversely 
affects the defendant's ability to borrow money, damages the defendant's reputation, 
and hangs over the defendant's head, threatening any property that the defendant later 
decides to bring into Europe. 126 
Given such a predicament when sued by a French plaintiff, a U.S. defendant with 
a good jurisdictional argument, even one who has assets only in the United States, may 
well choose to enter an appearance in France, and then push its insurer to cover the 
costs of the defense in France, just as Yahoo! did. 127 It may also push its insurer to 
cover the costs ofa declaratory judgment action in the U.S., as Yahoo!, whose insurer 
refused coverage for this proactive strategy, was doing in court. 128 All of this is 
expensive, and all of this is therefore likely to affect insurance premiums, settlement 
rates, and even primary conduct by anyone who fears somehow ending up in a French 
court. 129 In other words, the shadow cast by Article 14 may be a long one. 
C. Future Use of Article 14 Jurisdiction 
As the French like to point out, there is greater use of U.S. exorbitant jurisdiction 
than there is of Article 14 jurisdiction. This is not only because the U.S. bases are 
easier to invoke but also because more defendants have assets in the United States and 
more plaintiffs, in numbers and kinds, can invoke it. Nonetheless, France may be 
ready to close the gap. 
Since the Brussels Convention of 1968, an increased variety of plaintiffs can use 
Article 14 jurisdiction, and, more significantly, there has been an ever-greater 
extension toward pan-European enforcement. 130 The Convention entered into force in 
1973, obligating Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to 
enforce French judgments. By the end of the 1980s, it had extended to Denmark, 
Greece, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. By the end of the 1990s, either the Brussels 
or Lugano Convention had also obligated Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Poland, 
1980); Peter Hay, International Versus Interstate Conflicts Law i~ the United States, 35 RABELS 
ZEITSCHRJIT 429, 449-50 & 450 n.101 (1971). 
126. See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 13 (1991); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320,331 n.20(1980); 
Street v. Honorable Second Court of Appeals, 756 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1988); Montfort v. Jeter, 567 
S.W.2d 498, 499-500 (Tex. 1978); Hernandez v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 464 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. 1971). 
127. See Second Amended Complaint for Damages at 4, Yahoo! Inc. v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 
02-3066 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2002). 
128. See id. at 7; Shannon Lafferty, Yahoo Sues Its Insurer over Nazi Case Fees, LAW.COM, May 30, 
2002, http://www.law.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ 
View&c=Law Article&cid= 1022788124580&t=Law Article Tech. 
129. See Droz, supra note 52, at 13 ("JI nous a ete confie que dans certains contra ts intemationaux des 
hommes d'ajfaires s 'engageaient de maniere formelle a ne jamais contracter une assurance aupres d'une 
compagnie fran~aise afin d'eviter le risque d'une subrogation entrainant la competence du tribunal 
fran~ais. "). 
130. See supra Part ill.A.2.c. 
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Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland to enforce French judgments. 131 With the 
expansion of the European Union in 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia joined this list 
of obligated states. 132 
As mentioned above, Yahoo! has tried to comply with the Paris court's order, 
even though the U.S. court ruled that it was unenforceable within the United States. 
Presumably it is worried about protecting its assets in France, including its interests in 
its subsidiary, Yahoo! France. But it is also presumably worried about protecting its 
assets in Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, 
all of which are required to enforce French judgments against it. 
Another illustration of the effect of the Brussels Regulation and Lugano 
Convention is a less well-known lawsuit over a museum in Venice. The Solomon R. 
Guggenheim Foundation is a New York nonprofit corporation that manages its late 
benefactor's large art collection! 33 Known to New Yorkers by its spiral-shaped 
museum on Fifth Avenue, the Foundation began aggressively marketing an expanding 
array of museums around the world in the l 990s. 134 One of these museums was the 
Peggy Guggenheim Collection in Venice, which Solomon's niece Peggy had given to 
the Foundation near the end of her life in 1979. 135 Housed in Peggy's palazzo, which 
was included in the gift, the museum soon underwent some renovations that were not 
to the liking of three of Peggy's grandchildren. 136 
So the grandchildren sued the Foundation in 1992, arguing that Peggy had given 
away her collection on the condition that it not be modified and seeking a court order 
to restore the palazzo to its original condition, as well as compensatory damages 
reportedly in the dollar range of six-figures. 137 Although they easily could have sued 
the Foundation in Venice or New York, the grandchildren happened to be domiciled 
in France, and so they took advantage of the combined power of Article 14 jurisdiction 
and the Brussels Convention to sue in Paris. 138 
131. For a convenient table showing the dates on which the Brussels Convention and its progeny entered 
into force as between each state party, see ADRIAN BRIGGS, CML JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS 449-50 
(Peter Rees ed., 2d ed. 1997). For a list of the most recent accessions, see Conventions, 2005 INT'L LITIG. 
PROC. 488; EC Regulations and Decisions, 2005 INT'L LiTIG. PROC. 490. 
132. See Treaty of Accession to the European Union 2003, Apr. 16, 2003, arts. 2, 20, annex II, available 
at http ://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/treaty _of_ accession_ 2003/index.htm. 
133. See Guggenheim Museum Website, http://www.guggenheim.org/exhibitions/past_exhibitions/ 
new __guggenheim/index.html (last visited Aug. I, 2003). 
134. See Alex Prud'homme, The CEO of Culture Inc., nME, Jan. 20, 1992, at 36. 
135. See Thomas M. Messer, The History of a Courtship, in KAROLE P.B. VAIL, PEGGY GUGGENHEIM: 
A CELEBRATION 127, 127-51 (1998) (providing a first-hand account of the Foundation's campaign to 
acquire Peggy's collection). 
136. See Prud'homme, supra note 134, at 37 (quoting one of the grandchildren as complaining that the 
Foundation had "robbed the museum of all its originality and personality''). The renovations started in 1982, 
and animosity between the grandchildren and the Foundation appears to go back even earlier. See ANTON 
GILL, ART LoVER: A BIOGRAPHY OF PEGGY GUGGENHEIM 432-33 (2002). 
13 7. See Georges R. Delaume, Introductory Note to France: Court of Cassation Decision in Foundation 
Solomon R. Guggenheim v. David He/ion, Nicholas He/ion and Sandro Rumney, 37 I.L.M. 653, 654 ( 1998). 
The reported six-figure number in pounds comes from Georgina Adam, Art Sales: Charity in Court, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH {LoNDON), Apr. 25, 1994, at 16. 
138. See Fond. Solomon R. Guggenheim v. Helion, Cass. le civ., July 3, 1996, 124 JOURNAL DU DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL 1016 (1997), affg CA Paris, Nov. 17, 1993, 121 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 671
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The Foundation did not seem to have had any connection to France. It was not 
incorporated there, and none ofits museums were there. Although Peggy Guggenheim 
had spent time in France, 139 there was no connection between France and the cause of 
action. The case involved a gift made in Italy and the U.S. defendant's subsequent 
conduct in Italy. Moreover, part of the relief sought was a court order that would have 
to be carried out in Italy. In the absence of the Brussels Convention or any similar 
treaty, 140 the Foundation might have worried less about the suit, because neither Italy 
nor New York would have been likely to enforce a French judgment rendered in these 
circumstances. So the Foundation could have ignored the suit and happily gone about 
its business of creating museums around the world, provided it was willing to avoid 
bringing assets into France. With the Convention in place, however, the Foundation 
had to respond. Any French judgment not only could be enforced against its Venice 
museum, but also could be enforced against its assets elsewhere in Europe. Peggy's 
discontented grandchildren consequently had no problem dragging the Foundation into 
an unfamiliar, distant courtroom in a country with which the Foundation had no 
contacts. This case, then, provides a nice example of the growing power of Article 
14.141 
In order to truly comprehend Article 14's potential, one must also consider the 
huge quantity of U.S. assets that are exposed to French judgments. Although it is 
probably impossible to calculate anything close to an accurate total, the following 
figures help to convey the order of magnitude. In 1999 U.S. investors had almost $600 
billion in net financial claims (both equity and debt) on business enterprises located 
in countries that are obligated to enforce French judgments under the Brussels 
Regulation or Lugano Convention; by 2001, this amount had increased by 18 percent 
to surpass $710 billion.142 Many of these interests are likely exposed to French judgments. 
( 1994) (rejecting jurisdictional defenses). 
139. See generally GILL, supra note 136, at 71-259. 
140. See SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER, THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURJSDICTION AND 
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 54-66 (2003) (describing predecessor treaties). 
141. Another reason for defending in France was reputational, as the Foundation wished to address the 
merits immediately. Telephone Interview with Judith Cox, former General Counsel, Solomon R. 
Guggenheim Foundation (Jan. 15, 2004). The Foundation ultimately prevailed in the case, but it incurred 
significant expenses in doing so. See Roger Bevan, French Court Dismisses Case Against Guggenheim, 
ART NEWSPAPER, Jan. 1995, at 3. The extent to which Peggy had actually placed legally enforceable 
conditions on the gift was not entirely clear, which may be why the plaintiffs' case ultimately fell apart. 
According to a recent book by the wife of one of the plaintiffs, Peggy had "stipulated that the Peggy 
Guggenheim Collection should remain intact and complete in the Palazzo Venier dei Leoni, 'without 
addition or deletion'; that certain works were never to be loaned, and that the rest of the collection could 
only leave the palazzo during the winter." LAURENCE TACOU-RUMNEY, PEGGY GUGGENHEIM: A 
COLLECTOR'S ALBUM 171 ( l 996)(footnote omitted). Another author similarly states that Peggy had "deeded 
the ownership of her ... collection ... [with] the provision that ... [it] must remain intact, 'as is-without 
additions or deletions,' in her Venetian palazzo." JOHN H. DA VIS, THE GUGGENHEIMS 1848-1988: AN 
AMERICAN EPIC 389 (1988). According to one author, however, there was an initial agreement that provided 
that Peggy's collection should remain in Venice, but Peggy subsequently gave her collection to the 
Foundation with no strings attached. JACQUELINE BOGRAD WELD, PEGGY: THE WAYWARD GUGGENHEIM 
421 (1986); see also GILL, supra note 136, at 433 (discussing the continuing struggle between the 
grandchildren and the Foundation over the management of Peggy's collection). 
142. These figures derive from the data presented in Jeffrey H. Lowe, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: 
Detail for Historical-Cost Position and Related Capital and Income Flows, 2001, SURV. CURRENT Bus. 
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Consider also the U.S. tax return data on the 7500 largest foreign corporations in 
which major U.S. corporations own a controlling share. 143 In 1998 (the latest year for 
which data were available) at least 307 major U.S. corporations controlled such foreign 
corporations that were incorporated in countries obligated to enforce French judgments 
under the Brussels Regulation or Lugano Convention. 144 While each country's rules 
on grabbing stock to satisfy judgments vary, much of this foreign stock owned by U.S. 
corporations is likely exposed to French judgments. 145 Even to the extent that the stock 
itselfis not exposed, various transactions between the controlled corporations and their 
parent corporations should expose significant U.S. assets to French judgments. For 
example, the controlled corporations, having over $1. 7 trillion in assets by the end of 
1998, paid more than $53 billion to their U.S. owners that year. 146 
Given this growing pool of assets exposed to French judgments, one may see an 
increase in the use of Article 14 jurisdiction in the corning years. French plaintiffs' 
lawyers may soon wake up and start using Article 14 more aggressively, maybe with 
U.S. lawyers' advice. While Article 14 jurisdiction will continue to lurk in the 
background of numerous cases, having its main effects by casting a shadow, it may 
increasingly move into the forefront, applying expressly. Therefore, in evaluating 
(U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis), Sept. 2002, at 68, 75 tbl.10.1, 77 tbl.10.3, 
available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/ARTICLES/2002/09September/0902USDIA.pdf. The figures are 
calculated by adding the "U.S. Direct Investment Position" in the fifteen E.U. countries with that in Norway 
and Switzerland (the only Lugano Convention member states for which data are listed). "U.S. Direct 
Investment Position" is defined as the value of U.S. direct investors' equity in, and net outstanding loans 
to, their foreign affiliates. "U.S. direct investors" are, in tum, defined as U.S. residents who own at least 10 
percent of the voting securities of an incorporated foreign business enterprise or an equivalent interest in 
an unincorporated foreign business enterprise, with "foreign affiliates" being defined as those business 
enterprises. See id. at 69. 
143. See JOHN COMISKY, I.R.S., CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS, 1998 (2003), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/98cfcart.pdf. For the purpose of these statistics, a foreign corporation is 
"controlled" if one U.S. corporation owns "more than 50 percent of its outstanding voting stock, or more 
than 50 percent of the value of all its outstanding stock (directly, indirectly, or constructively)," for an 
uninterrupted period of at least 30 days during a given year. Id. at 47. "Major U.S. corporations" are 
defined here as those with total assets of at least $500 million. See id. 
144. This figure represents only the U.S. corporations that controlled corporations incorporated in certain 
E.U. countries. See id. at 67 tbl.2. The figure ignores controlled corporations incorporated in France and 
Italy because the IRS statistics lump these two countries with Andorra and San Marino, neither of which are 
obligated to enforce French judgments under the Brussels Regulation or Lugano Convention. In addition, 
the figure ignores controlled corporations incorporated in Norway and Switzerland--both of which are 
obligated to enforce French judgments under the Lugano Convention--because the data do not indicate how 
many of the U.S. corporations also controlled corporations incorporated in the E.U. countries, and thus 
whether or not they were already counted in the first figure. See id. at 67 tbl.2, 76 n.1. In sum, 307 is really 
the bare minimum number of U.S. corporations with such assets. 
145. On the use of stocks to satisfy judgments in France, see HERZOG & WESER, supra note 56, at 577-
78. For an example of a German court attaching foreign-owned stock in a German corporation, see Christof 
von Dryander, Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters Under the German Code of Civil Procedure, 
16 INT'L LAW. 671, 682 (1982) (discussing the attachment of the Iranian government's stock in Friedrich 
Krupp GmbH); Lawrence W. Newman, A Personal History of Claims Arising out of the Iranian Revolution, 
27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 631,637 (1995) (same). 
146. These figures are calculated from Comisky, supra note 143, at 67 tbl.2, by adding the reported data 
for all E. U. countries combined with that for Norway and Switzerland, and then subtracting the reported data 
for France and Italy for the reasons explained supra note 144. 
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Article 14, one should contemplate not only the past and present, but also the possibly 
more troublesome future. 
IV. OTHER COUNTRIES 
Of course, the United States and France are not alone in their exorbitant 
jurisdictions. Indeed, most nations appear to have succumbed to similar parochial 
impulses. These impulses have been expressed in a variety ofways. 147 But there are 
only three major forms that merit mention. 
First, the Netherlands replaced French nationality-based jurisdiction with 
jurisdiction based on the plaintiff's dornicile. 148 This basis is narrower than Article 14 
jurisdiction in that it excludes nationals domiciled abroad, but also broader than Article 
14 jurisdiction in that it includes the country's noncitizen domiciliaries. As a result of 
the Brussels Regulation and Lugano Convention,jurisdiction based on the plaintiff's 
domicile can be employed in France itself today against a defendant who is not a 
Brussels/Lugano domiciliary. 149 
Second, the German code and its far-flung offspring take attachment jurisdiction, 
or forum arresti, to the extreme of forum patrimonii by authorizing jurisdiction not 
only over the property that is physically present, as U.S. law does, but over the person 
of the defendant whose property it is, even if that defendant defaults and lacks any 
other contacts with the forum country. 150 Germany otherwise follows the usual civil-
law approach, which makes no distinction between jurisdiction over things and 
jurisdiction over persons (but instead gets to similar results through the notion of 
exclusive jurisdiction for certain kinds of suits that intrinsically involve things). The 
drafters of Germany's Code of Civil Procedure adopted forum patrimonii in Article 23 
as a way to allow suits against foreigners; the drafters apparently considered this 
exorbitant basis of jurisdiction as simpler to apply than other jurisdictional choices 
contemplated for the same purpose, and justified it as "still less exorbitant than 
[French] Article 14 jurisdiction." 151 
More precisely, Article 23 authorizes ordinary personal jurisdiction given only the 
presence in Germany of a tangible or intangible thing belonging to the defendant, thus 
going considerably further than the U.S. authorization in certain circumstances of 
147. A modem listing of exorbitant jurisdiction types appeared in Article 18 of the draft Hague 
jurisdiction-and-judgments treaty, which can be found at the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law's Website, http://www.hcch.net/up1oad/wop/jdgm2001draft_e.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2005). Later 
the Hague negotiations contracted to a narrow convention treating business-to-business contracts containing 
choice-of-court agreements that select forums for disputes to the exclusion of other forums, and so the draft 
dropped Article 18 as unnecessary. For the content of the eventual convention, see 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98 (last visited Sept. 3, 2005). 
148. On the Dutch use of this basis of jurisdiction (which is contained in the Dutch Code of Civil 
Procedure art. 126(3)), see 2 DELAUME, supra note 45, § 8.07, at 16-17; Nadelmann, supra note 7, at 999, 
1020 n.150; Pearce, supra note 45, at 539-40. 
149. See supra Part ill.A.2.c. 
150. On the German use of this basis of jurisdiction (which is contained in their Code of Civil Procedure 
art. 23), see CLERMONT, supra note 52, at 14-16; Nadelmann, supra note 2, at 328-30; Nadelmann, supra 
note 7, at 999, 1020 n.149. 
15 I. Nadelmann, supra note 7, at I 01 I (noting that forum patrimonii was adopted, following unification, 
from the Prussian Code, in which it had existed since 1809). 
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jurisdiction over a thing based upon presence of the thing. Recovery in a German case 
founded on presence of goods is not limited to the value of the goods, although 
obviously the plaintiff might have trouble enforcing the judgment outside Germany. 
Traditionally the cause of action did not have to relate to the thing or even to Germany, 
but the German Supreme Court has recently invented a vague but significant 
requirement that the plaintiff be domiciled in Germany or the cause of action be linked 
to Germany. 152 The forum-shopping potential remains a little frightening, as many 
enterprises have assets in countries with the German-derived law that yields such 
judgments or in countries bound by the Brussels Regulation and Lugano Convention 
to enforce such judgments. 
Third, a number of countries assert exorbitant bases of jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction based on the plaintiff's nationality or domicile or on the defendant's 
property, but only over the national of a country that would assert such a basis of 
jurisdiction over the forum's nationals. These countries' desires are not to exercise 
exorbitant jurisdiction, but to discourage others from doing so. In other words, these 
countries employ exorbitant jurisdiction as a retaliatory measure, in what one author 
has termed "reactive or anticipatory reciprocity." 153 The countries employing such 
jurisdiction include Belgium, Italy, and Portugal. 154 Retaliation can be effective in 
inducing a superior treaty-based solution. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When one compares different countries' approaches to international jurisdiction, 
it becomes apparent that differences do not predominate. 155 The evolution of 
jurisdictional rules demonstrates how different legal systems tend toward so-called 
convergence, given similar influences. Jurisdictional convergence is often seen as 
limited to the nonexorbitant bases, however. The exorbitant bases on each side stand 
out as looking foreign to the outsider. They seem to set countries apart, to reveal 
fundamental differences. 
Closer examination nevertheless suggests that the world's exorbitant bases of 
jurisdiction may not be so different after all. Even in the doctrinal details of these 
exorbitant bases, where national peculiarities start to peak, the differences are smaller 
than they initially appear. French nationality-based jurisdiction (or Dutch domicile-
based or German property-based jurisdiction) may not sound much like U.S. transient 
or attachment or doing-business jurisdiction, but in fact they share a common core: 
nations incline to disregard defendants' interests in order to give their own people a 
152. See ANDREAS F. LoWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 241, 251-54 (2d ed. 
2002). 
153. Pearce, supra note 45, at 540. 
154. Id. For the Belgian use of this basis of jurisdiction (which is contained in their Code Judiciaire arts. 
636 & 638), see 2 DELAUME, supra note 45, § 8.07, at 17; Nadelmann, supra note 7, at 999, 1014-16, 1021; 
Pearce, supra note 45, at 540. On the Italian use of this basis (which is contained in their Code of Civil 
Procedure art. 4( 4)), see MAURO CAPPELLETTI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CIVIL PROCEDURE INIT AL y 89 ( 1965); 
2 DELAUME, supra note 45, § 8.06, at 16. For the Portuguese use of this basis (which is contained in their 
Code of Civil Procedure art. 65( I)( c )), see Pearce, supra note 45, at 540. 
155. See Kevin M. Clermont, A Global Law of Jurisdiction and Judgments: Views from the United States 
and Japan, 37 CORNELL INT'L L. J. I, 7 (2004). 
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way to sue at home, if the home country will be able to enforce the resulting judgment 
locally. 
Even if thus understandable, exorbitant jurisdiction is, by definition, not a 
desideratum. Indeed, to perceive its common core is to appreciate its pervasive 
dangers. National variations and extensions beyond the core only make it worse. 
Elimination of exorbitant jurisdiction by international agreement should remain the 
ultimate goal. 
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